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Abstract
This thesis will assess influential guerrilla doctrine advising optimal insurgent (1) operational environment, (2)
organizational structure, (3) logistical capacity, and (4) dependent tactics - items of consistent, yet incomplete
analysis in counter-insurgency (COIN) analytics and civil war scholarship. Following a review of five of the
most infamously disseminated guerrilla doctrine and training manuals, this thesis derives a model of advised
guerrilla war production. The derived model illustrating the strategic and operational principles of reviewed
doctrine presents an organizational hybrid between guerrilla hierarchies and networks, positing optimal
organizational structure as a function of operational environment. Logistical capacity, tactics, target set, and
military classification are in turn best determined by organizational structure. An otherwise unobserved
operational dynamic relating each of the above four enumerated strategic considerations is thereby illustrated,
with implications for COIN theory and praxis.
To present a more systematic evaluation of reviewed guerrilla doctrine, the derived model is evaluated against
a qualitative case-study of Peru's Shining Path insurgency. Case-study empirics are drawn from the
Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset (ACD) on dyadic conflict (Cederman, Min, Wimmer 2010), Arc
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) spatial analysis software, declassified Peruvian intelligence reports,
and captured Shining Path documents and directives from the Peruvian insurrection between 1969 - 1989.
This study finds that evaluated guerrilla doctrine accurately reflects the material conditions of insurgency.
There is one caveat: The global trends of increasing urbanization, dissolution of state power, and decline in
politically motivated insurgency, may contribute to an observed shift in non-state actor war production from
rural to increasingly urban and civilian-centric economies of violence. Lessons on strategically important
considerations like sanctuary, terrain, state capacity, network evolution, and weapons proliferation, attend.
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i. Introduction: Composition, Findings, and Contributions
Practitioners and scholars of COIN often debate the effects of operational environment, network
structure, logistical capacity, and tactics on the ability of violent non-state actors to initiate and
sustain insurgency. What guerrilla theoreticians say themselves, however, on fundamental
strategic considerations like front and organization, is rarely cited. This thesis will accordingly
assess the strategic and operational value of influential guerrilla doctrine, infamously proliferated
in print and HTML, while addressing the failure of COIN and civil war scholarship to fully
illuminate the relationship between guerrilla operational environment and organizational
structure. Yet how useful is guerrilla doctrine, often labeled the work of unsound minds, to the
student and practitioner of COIN? What can it tell us about the organization and evolution of
guerrilla networks, and asymmetric conflict today?
This thesis attempts a threefold response. First, a survey of five of the most influential
guerrilla manuals in the history of modem insurgency is presented.' Invariably, the theoretician's
aim is to advise his cadre on how to best organize and effectively prosecute guerrilla war against
a superior force. As such advised strategy and tactics bear a striking similarity across a
heterogeneous sample of major asymmetric violent conflicts, representing a scholarly continuum
of insurgent thought developed, tested, and refined over decades. As in COIN scholarship, four
interacting strategic considerations are consistently emphasized by guerrilla theoreticians,
namely: (1) operational environment, (2) organizational structure, (3) logistical capacity, and (4)
dependent tactics. Particular attention is given to guerrilla organizations, as they are conceived
and optimized to fight in distinct urban and/or rural theatres.
1 "On Guerrilla Warfare" (Tse-Tung 1937); "Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla" (Guill6n 1966); "Guerrilla Warfare"
(Guevara 1969); "Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla" (Marighella 1971); and "A Practical Course for Guerrilla War"
(al-Muqrin ca. 2004). A rationale for manual selection is presented in section II.
Second, to advance a more rigorous evaluation of influential guerrilla doctrine, this thesis
derives a model illustrating the underlying operational dynamic relating each of the above four
enumerated strategic considerations. To this end, the essential material constraint of operational
environment is first identified and selected as an independent variable. A model illustrating how
the independent variable of operational environment affects the dependent variables of
organizational structure, logistical capacity, and military classification, is subsequently derived.
This model presents a fluid spectrum of guerrilla organization, positing optimal organizational
structure as a function of operational environment. Tactics, target set, and military classification
are in turn best determined by network structure. An operational dynamic relating insurgent front
and organization -otherwise unobserved in COIN analytics and civil war scholarship- is thus
illustrated, with lessons on how guerrilla networks do and will evolve across multiple operational
environments in rural and/or urban theatres.
Third, this thesis examines the validity of its derived model against a case study review of
one of the most successful guerrilla organizations in modern history: Peru's Sendero Luminoso,
or Shining Path (henceforth SL). Case-study empirics on approximate conflict location, onset,
duration, and termination are drawn from the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset (ACD) on
dyadic conflict (Cederman, Min, Wimmer 2010). To determine the external validity of guerrilla
doctrine reviewed and modeled in this thesis, captured SL documents and directives from the
Peruvian insurrection between 1969 - 1989, and secondary-source literature documenting SL
organizational evolution and areas of operation are assessed against terrain, topography, and
population maps generated through ArcGIS spatial analysis software. It is subsequently
determined that evaluated guerrilla doctrine accurately reflects battlefield conditions. The
modeled operational dynamic relating insurgent front and organization, as detailed in reviewed
guerrilla doctrine, is also observed. The global trends of increasing urbanization, dissolution of
state power, and decline in politically motivated non-state actor violence may, however,
contribute to an increase in typically rare urban guerrilla war.2
This thesis makes four contributions to the field of insurgency studies. First, it confirms
the strategic and operational value of influential guerrilla doctrine. Second, guerrilla field
manuals are reviewed and evaluated not in isolation, but as belonging to a rich, parallel dialogue
the COIN scholar and practitioner would do well to consider. Third, by modeling the underlying
operational dynamic relating optimal insurgent (1) operational environment, (2) organizational
structure, (3) logistical capacity, and (4) dependent tactics, this thesis highlights the fundamental
variable of operational environment, and by extension, sanctuary. As will be discussed, an
appreciation of the organizational salience of guerrilla sanctuary, and the mediums that provide it
-physical or otherwise- is essential to understanding and predicting past, current, and future
modes of insurgent mobilization. Fourth, a shift toward urbanized, apolitical modes of guerrilla
organization and violence, is identified, and suggested as an avenue for future research.
The remainder of this paper will proceed in five sections. The first section will provide a
literature and data review, and define working definitions and analytical scope. The second
section will review relevant guerrilla doctrine vis-i-vis optimal network organization and choice
of tactics as a function of theatre. The third section will provide a model, derived from reviewed
manuals and data presented in Section I & II, of the relationship between operational
environment, organizational structure, and dependent logistical capacity. The implications of this
model with regard to guerrilla military classification, as determined by tactics, will also be
2 Although a study of relevant global trends is beyond the scope of this thesis, increasing, likely unsustainable
urbanization, exacerbating state security and services provision, will be considered. For an in-depth look at some of the
challenges of 21st century urban governance, see "Governance in the 21st Century." Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2001. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/0/17394484.pdf
considered. The fourth section will present a case study of SL, evaluating the external validity of
models derived in Section 1II. The fifth section concludes with a summary and policy
implications. Appendix I provides advised guerrilla force structures. Appendix II lists a universe
of identified insurgencies (Fearon and Laitin 2006).3
3 Fearon, James and David Laitin. Additional Tablesfor Ethnicity, Insurgeng, and Civil War. Department of Political Science,
Stanford University. 2006, pp. 7-10.
I. Review: Literature, Definitions, Data, and Scope
This section will review COIN and civil war literature examining guerrilla operational
environment, organizational structure, logistical capacity, and dependent tactics. Working
definitions, study scope, and case-study datasets will also be presented. Following a review of
COIN and civil war scholarship, it seems a complex operational dynamic relating insurgent front
and network structure remains unexplored. Relevant guerrilla doctrine may thus be illuminating.
1.1. Literature: Missed Connections
Operational Environment
To say that insurgent operational environment, organizational structure, logistical capacity, and
dependent tactics, are variables meriting equal consideration, absent any implicit hierarchy, is
inaccurate. Operational environment is of principal study and emphasis in civil war scholarship
and guerrilla theory alike. This is because systemic, ethno-geographic variables such as terrain,
government control, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, and distance from capital -variables
largely defining insurgent operational environment- are widely acknowledged to influence, even
determine the capacity of violent non-state actors to initiate and sustain insurgency.4
As such extant civil war scholarship presents a series of studies on the relationship
between non-state actor modes of war production and the relative effects of distinct operational
environments (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Cederman and Girardin 2007;
4 It is for this reason that operational environment will be selected as the to-be-presented model's independent variable.
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Buhaug, Cederman, and Rod 2008; Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch 2009).5 Of particular
interest is research on the systemic variable of terrain, which advances an observed distinction
between rural and urban models of asymmetric conflict. Influential scholarship posits rural
sanctuary, and rough, especially mountainous terrain, limiting state control and services, as
essential for initiating and sustaining rebellion (Lemke 1995; Kalyvas 2006).6 New work
challenges this assumption, citing overlooked examples of protracted urban violence and
insurgency (Rodgers 2007; Staniland 2010).7
Although scholarship exploring the perceived divide between rural and urban guerrilla
war illuminates the essential variable of operational environment, and establishes an implicit link
between theatre and organizational capacity, it fails to identify a more complex relationship
between front and organization and its corresponding effect on civil war onset and duration. Case
study guerrilla mobilization and dependent tactics are for example presented as definite models
s For each, see Fearon, James D. "Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country." Journal ofEconomic Growth 8(2). 2003, pp.
195-222; Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. "Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars." Oxford Economic Papers 56(4). 2004, pp.
563-95; Cederman, Lars-Erik, and Luc Girardin. "Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity Onto Nationalist
Insurgencies." American Political Science Review 101 (1). 2007, pp. 173-85; Buhaug, Halvard, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Jan-
Ketil Rod. "Disaggregating Ethno Nationalist Civil Wars: A Dyadic Test of Exclusion Theory." International Organization
62(3). 2008, pp. 531-51; Cederman, Lars-Erik, Halvard Buhaug, and Jan-Ketil Rod. "Ethno-nationalist Dyads and Civil
War: A GIS-based Analysis." Journal of Conflict Resolution 53(4). 2009, pp. 569-525.
6 Prominent civil war scholar Stathis Kalyvas notes the salience of terrain with regard to exercising population control -a
strategic concept central to the fundamental task of gathering accurate intelligence necessary to effectively apply selective
violence. Kalyvas, Stathis N. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge University Press. 2006, pp. 132-133. On the
limiting effects of mountainous terrain, see Lemke, Douglas. 'The Tyranny of Distance: Redefining Relevant Dyads',
International Interactions 21(1). 1995, pp. 23-38.
7 Noting a critical shift in the political economy of violence in Latin America from "political" to "social" violence, Senior
Fellow Dennis Rodgers at the London School of Economics examines urban violence in Nicaragua as representative of
a paradigm shift from politically motivated violence and insurrection, to rent motivated, apolitical, urban war production.
Rodgers however focuses on apolitical criminal networks, rather than the politically motivated rebel organizations that
are the focus of this thesis. Work by Professor Paul Staniland at the University of Chicago is more relevant to our
purposes. Citing, for example, the rise of insurgency in Karachi from 1978 to 1996 in "Cities On Fire: Social
Mobilization, State Policy, and Urban Insurgency," Staniland is more or less at odds with Kalyvas' notion that it is rural,
rather than urban operational environments, that are most likely to serve as a base for guerrilla insurgency. Staniland,
however, provides an important caveat: urban centers are as likely as rural hinterlands to give rise to guerrilla
insurgencies provided incumbent governments are somehow limited in the level of violence they may expect to apply. As will be noted, this
observation complements the basic findings of this thesis. For when cities burn, see Staniland, Paul. "Cities on Fire:
Social Mobilization, State Policy, and Urban Insurgency." Journal of Comparative Politics, 2010. On slum wars, see Rodgers,
Dennis. "Slum Wars of the 21st Century: Gangs, Mano Dura, and the New Urban Geography of Conflict in Central
America." Development and Change, 40(5). 2007, pp. 949-976.
of non-state actor violence, often removed from a more fluid spectrum of organizational patterns
determined by the material constraints of battlefields within or across examples of urban and/or
rural asymmetric conflict. Guerrillas do not, however, limit war to the operational dichotomy of
rural or urban. They fight across multiple fronts, with organizational patterns of varying
logistical efficiency optimized for mission and theatre.
It would stand to reason that the material constraints of distinct operational environments,
often shifting longitudinally across a campaign in both time and space, may affect the
organizational sophistication and corresponding capacity of a guerrilla organization to initiate
and sustain insurgency.8 Civil war onset and duration may thus be linked to the impact of
operational environment on successful guerrilla mobilization and organization. A more inclusive
model of the relationship between the operational environment and organizational structure of
violent non-state actors, is however lacking.
Organizational Structure
The question of participation is fundamental to an understanding of guerrilla mobilization -what
motivates men and women to rebel, and to what degree of participation and organization? COIN
and civil war scholarship has accordingly moved from binary modes of guerrilla participation
(Berdal, Mats and Malone 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2004),9 to a range of organizational
8 For example, the material constraints of distinct operational environments may shift as a nation moves from
predominantly rural to urban-centric economies and demographics (time), and from the rural periphery to the urban
center (space).
9 Guerrilla motivation and participation in COIN literature were initially limited to "greed" or "grievance," with the
would-be fighter deciding to either "rebel" or "not rebel." Although useful for microeconomic modeling, this limitation
of the human decision making process and available range of social roles to a more tractable binary obscures the
complex web of systemic and individual mechanisms compelling men and women to commit and/or aid mass violence.
On the greed or grievance debate, see Berdal, Mats, and Malone. Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars.
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000. Also: Collier and Hoeffler. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." Oxford
Economic Papers 56. 2004, pp. 563-595. On the tendency in civil war scholarship to limit guerrilla participation in guerrilla
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involvement considering multiple, micro-mechanisms triggering action (Petersen 2001; Lindsey
and Petersen 2011).10 This new focus in civil war studies at once offers a more nuanced theory of
insurgency, specifying a spectrum of organizational participation, while shifting the unit of
analysis from nations, to individuals.
Despite new research exploring individual participation in insurgency, less is said on the
intermediary of the cooperative, as recorded by insurgent theoreticians themselves." Counter-
insurgents fight as a group, and according to doctrine specifying strategy and procedure
(Petraeus et al. 2006).12 Unsurprisingly, so do insurgents. Work on individuals is important, but
men rarely fight alone, and less so effectively. They fight as dynamic organizations, evolving
war to a simple binary, see Petersen, Roger. Resistance and Rebellion: Lessonsfrom Eastern Europe. Cambridge University
Press, 2001, p. 8.
10 Petersen (2001) moves from the binary "to rebel" or "not rebel," to a spectrum of individual participation moving
from -3 (full military commitment to the rebel cause), to +3 (full military commitment to the incumbent cause), with
degrees of individual involvement in between (-2, 2 [strong]; -1, 1 [weak]; 0 [neutral]). At each stage, mechanisms
motivating or dissuading of movement along the conflict spectrum are specified. Lindsey and Petersen (2011) provide a
similar spectrum of Iraqi insurgent involvement between 2006-2007. COIN strategy targeting systemic and individual
factors motivating escalation in participation is subsequently identified. The above noted spectrum of insurgent
involvement considering multiple mechanisms triggering action will be revisited when presenting a working definition of
insurgency and a description of SL graduated force structure. On graduated insurgent participation, see Petersen, Roger.
Resistance and Rebellion: Lessonsfrom Eastern Europe. Cambridge University Press. 2001, pp. 8-9. For an application of
Petersen's spectrum of insurgent participation to COIN theatres in Iraq, see Lindsey, John, and Roger Petersen. Varieties
of Counterinsurgency: A Case Study of Iraq. Newport: Naval War College, 2011.
" There are notable exceptions. On guerrilla theory, a short review of al-Qa'ida doctrine is attempted by the former head
of the CIA's now defunct Bin Laden Unit Dr. Michael Scheuer. Scheuer, valuably, notes the regimental, group fighting
of violent non-state actors like al-Qa'ida. On organization, there are two notable examples: First, the recent spate of
work studying the post-9/11 phenomenon of decentralized terrorist networks. Second, COIN analytics assessing
guerrilla movements consistently emphasize the organization -rather than the individual or nation- as the fundamental
fighting unit. The former is however more focused on civilian-centric terrorist organizations, while the latter has yet to
fully penetrate academia. On Sheuer's review of al-Qa'ida doctrine, see Scheuer, Michael. "Al-Qaeda's Insurgency
Doctrine: Aiming for a 'Long War'." Terronsm Focus 3(8). 2006. On networks, see John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt.
"Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy. " RAND. 2001; From Pablo to Osama: Traficking and
Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation. University Park: Penn State University Press. 2007;
Sageman, Michael. "Understanding Terror Networks." Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2004. On COIN
analytics considering organizations as the principal unit of analysis during the Cold and Long Wars, see Molnar, Andrew.
"Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies." Department of the Army. 1966.
http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/docrepository/dapam550_104insurgencies.pdf; and Hammidov, Bakhtiyorjon. "The Fall of
the Taliban Regime and its Recovery as an Insurgent Movement in Afghanistan." U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College. 2004, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA428904.
12 The 2006 Army and Marine Corps counter-insurgency manual FM-34 represents the first revisal of Army and Marine
Corps counter-insurgent doctrine in more than two decades. The essential message of FM-34 is to "learn and adapt the
ideas from the manual to their particular location and enemy." With a focus on doctrinal development and distribution,
and tactical evolution as a function of enemy organization, FM-34 illustrates the strategic value of defined procedure,
and organizational flexibility necessary to defeat a nimble enemy. Petraeus, David H., and James F. Amos. "FM-34:
Counterinsurgency." Headquarters Department of the Army. 2006.
with mission, environment, and opponent, with observable implications for expected tactics,
targets, and fields of operation (Randy and Gelles 2005; Binder, Gelvin, and Rapoport 201 1).13
Recent scholarship does consider insurgency at the organizational-unit of analysis;
however, most is best associated with post-9/1 1 work on civilian-centric terrorist networks
(CCN) (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2002 et al.).14 CCN -although often deployed by larger parent
organizations in hazardous operational environments- are different from hierarchical, military-
centric groups. The consequences of not appreciating this organizational distinction, and
environmental factors driving organizational evolution, dependent tactical innovation, and
military classification, are considered below.
Logistical Capacity, Dependent Tactics, and Military Classification
If guerrillas fight largely as organizations, fit to field and objective, what does this mean for
13 The organizational evolution of al-Qa'ida from a centralized, anti-Soviet insurgent organization, to a post-9/1 1,
decentralized network, is a subject of much scholarship. Academics seek macro and micro-mechanisms prompting
organizational evolution, while COIN practitioners try to stay one step ahead of a dynamic and dangerous target. Pre
and post-9/11 al-Qa'ida's record of organizational and tactical innovation across multiple rural and urban guerrilla fronts
is, for example, compelling evidence. Notably, organizational evolution is often accompanied by dependent tactical
innovation. One example is the use of Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) by
guerrilla combat units countering US armor in Iraq and Afghanistan. Upon detonation, an EFP with a 20 cm (8 in)
penetrator lens can throw a -3 kg slug of molten copper at ~2,000 m/s, producing ~60 times the kinetic energy of a .50
BMG round. EFP IED slugs are capable of penetrating 10.2 cm of armor at 90 m. The portable Iranian-made Shawaz
EFP IED used by HAMAS against Israeli vehicles, for example, is reported to be capable of penetrating 20.3 cm of
steel. EFP IED were used extensively by al-Qa'ida and Saddamist insurgents during the Third Gulf War. On EFP IED
general construction and use, see Burton, Fred. "The Imminent Spread of EFPs ." Straford.
http://www.stratfor.com/imminent..spread-efps. For Army estimates of EFP penetration, see EFP: Explosively Formed
Penetrators. CNN. On the HAMAS Shawaz EFP IED, see ShawaZ. United States Army Combined Arms Center.
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/thesaurus/toc.asp?id=346 96 . On EFP projectile velocities, weights, and lens
manufacture, see Atkinson, Rick. "Left of Boom." Washington Post. 2007, p. 11.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/46013675/LEFT-of-BOOM-PT-2. For an overview of pre and post-9/11 operational
evolution, see Borum, Randy, and Michael Gelles. "Al-Qaeda's Operational Evolution: Behavioral and Organizational
Perspectives." Behavioral Sciences and the Law. 2005, pp. 467-483. For a brief on post-Bin Laden al-Qa'ida, see University of
California at Los Angeles (UCLA) news room video brief Al-Qaeda After Bin-Laden, with UCLA professors Leonard
Binder, James Gelvin, and David Rapoport. http: / /newsroom.ucla.edu/portal/ucla/news-week-al-qaeda-after-bin-
laden-202606.aspx.
14 For additional work on networks, see John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt. "Networks and Netwars: The Future of
Terror, Crime, and Militancy." RAND. 2001; From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government
Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation. University Park: Penn State University Press, 2007; Sageman, Michael.
"Understanding Terror Networks." Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.
logistical capacity and dependent tactics -seemingly important, material considerations,
influencing the muddled military classifications insurgent, guerrilla, and terrorist? Work on
networks does consider the relationship between organizational evolution and logistical capacity.
It is for example understood that low network interconnectivity caused by cell
compartmentalization limits the logistical capacity of violent non-state actors lacking men and
support (Enders and Su 2007)."1 What is less studied is how a drop in logistical efficiency caused
by network evolution toward more compartmentalized models of organization affects feasible
tactics and corresponding target set -may less logistically capable units necessarily gravitate to
soft-target, civilian-centric tactics?
That a military classification of terrorism may lie with organizational rather than tactics-
based determinants, however, is unexplored. A conflation of military classification, as
determined by tactics, follows. Due to a primary or secondary employed tactic of terrorism, CCN
are often aggregated with distinct, military-centric guerrilla organizations (Hoffman 1999;
Abrahms 2004).16 And this is not an academic exercise -military classification matters. Policy
15 Enders and Su's work on rational network response to counter-terrorist infiltration efforts will form an important
component of the urban guerrilla force structure analysis presented in this thesis. Enders, Walters, and Xuejuan Su.
"Rational Terrorists and Optimal Network Structure." Journal of Conflict Resolution 51(1). 2007, pp. 33-57.
16 Although a discussion of scholarship on CCN is best considered on sub-section "organizational structure," it is
included here to demonstrate how a given violent non-state actor's choice of tactics -irrespective of other, more broad
organizational determinants, e.g. horizontally organized networks vs. hierarchical guerrilla armies- may result in a
misleading military classification, and corresponding recommendation of sub-optimal responsive tactics. For example,
following a review of several successful terrorist campaigns, Hoffman concludes "terrorism works." Yet Hoffman's case
studies seem to describe urban insurgencies (FLN in Algeria, EOKA in Cyprus, and the Irgun in Palestine), rather than
CCN. Hoffman may be assigning success to urban insurgencies using terrorist tactics. As such, perhaps Hoffman should have
concluded his historical overview with the less ambitious "terrorism, as a tactic, can work." In "Why Terrorism Does Not
Work," terrorism scholar Max Abrahms challenges the conventional wisdom that terrorism is an effective coercive
strategy. Analyzing the armed struggles of twenty-eight terrorist organizations -the complete list of foreign terrorist
organizations as designated by the US Department of State since 2001- Abrahms finds that terrorists only accomplish
first-order strategic objectives 7% of the time. Yet although Abrahms holds an opposing view to Hoffman on the
relative utility of terrorism as a coercive tactic, his analysis is plagued by the same definitional problem: rather than
confound urban insurgents with CCN, as Hoffman had, Abrahms confuses CCN with urban insurgents. Throughout his
analysis, Abrahms relies on the State Department's list of foreign terrorist organizations. The State Department makes
no distinction between primarily insurgent/quasi-political organizations that capture and control territory (e.g.
Hezbollah), and the civilian-centric terrorist organizations (e.g. post-9/11 al-Qa'ida) he claims to analyze. For Hoffman's
review of successful terrorist campaigns, see Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York: Colombia University Press,
makers may otherwise counter the wrong target, with the wrong strategy (Cronin 2011).17 As
will be further discussed in the proceeding pages, COIN and counter-terrorism (CT) may be
considered different models of warfare, with divergent -even antagonistic- strategic assumptions,
objectives, methods, and tactics (Boyle 2010)."
Missed Connections
The effects of operational environment on the organizational and logistical capacity of guerrillas
to initiate and sustain insurgency is widely recognized; that guerrillas need sanctuary to
effectively contest state power is a truism. Precisely why and how different operational
environments affect insurgent fighting ability, however, remains unexplained. Is it simply a
question of state capacity to punish insurgents over rough physical and/or human terrain? Or,
since guerrillas fight in groups, are there other, material constraints imposed by distinct
operational environments on the capacity of guerrillas to effectively organize and wage war?
What would this mean for feasible guerrilla logistics and tactics, and, correspondingly, how the
counter-insurgent identifies, targets, and counters his enemy?
There thus seems to be a complex, yet understudied material dynamic relating insurgent
operational environment, and organization, with material implications for logistical capacity and
feasible tactics. A model of this dynamic may provide the counter-insurgent and policy maker
with a more accurate understanding of how systemic conditions influence guerrilla
organizational evolution. Distinct organizational patterns may in turn affect COIN responsive
1998, ch. 1,2. For Abrahms on the effectiveness of terrorism, see Max Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work,"
InternationalSecuriy, 31(2). 2006, pp. 42-78.
17 Cronin, A.K. How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns. New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 2011.
18 MichaelJ. Boyle, "Do Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency Go Together?," International Affairs 86(2). 2010, pp.
334-353.
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strategy and tactics. We have seen what COIN and civil war scholarship have to say about the
relationship between insurgent front and organization. But what do the guerrilla fighter and
theoretician think?
Together with the counter-insurgent, the guerrilla fighter and theoretician are, after all, the
actors most affected by the material constraints of asymmetric battle. Guerrilla doctrine -what
may indeed represent a useful, parallel academic discussion, considering decidedly operational,
material battlefield constraints- may therefore be of use to the counter-insurgent. This thesis will
see to what extent, while shedding light on how guerrillas organize and fight as a function of
theatre.
1.2. Definitions: Insurgents, Guerrillas, Terrorists, CT or COIN, Terminology
Insurgents, Guerrillas, and Terrorists
One objective of this thesis is to distinguish between the oft-confounded terms insurgent,
guerrilla, and terrorist. The military classifications insurgent, guerrilla, and terrorist may be
briefly defined, respectively, as (1) the passive, sympathetic, or logistically active member of a
violent movement seeking to overthrow an existing social order through primarily military
tactics; (2) the militarily active member of a violent movement seeking to overthrow an existing
social order through primarily military tactics, and (3) the logistically or militarily active member
of a relatively small civilian-centric organization seeking to overthrow an existing social order
through primarily terrorist tactics.' 9
19 For a brief overview of the Department of Defense distinction between insurgents, guerrillas, and terrorists, see US
Military Academy training-manual document 'Insurgents vs. Guernillas vs. Terrorists" available at
http://usiraq.procon.org/sourcefiles/InsurgentsvsTerrorists.pdf.
With that, two important definitional determinants of the military classifications of
insurgent, guerrilla, and terrorist, are apparent. They are (1) degree ofparticipation in
insurgency, and (2) scale and sophistication of organization. We may now return to previous
civil war scholarship advancing a spectrum of rebel participation in guerrilla war.2 0 Fig. 1.2.1,
and accompanying explanations provided below, reproduced with permission from Lindsey and
Petersen (2011), additionally clarify the military classifications of "insurgent" and "guerrilla":
Fig. 1.2.1: Moving Beyond Binaries to a Spectrum of Particpation
Neutral (0): During any conflict between a government and its opponent, many individuals will
choose neutrality; these actors will try to avoid both sides and go about their daily lives with a
minimum of risk. They will not willingly provide information or material support to either the
government or the insurgents nor will they participate in public demonstrations for either side.
Unarmed, unorganized insurgent supporter (-1): While avoiding any armed role, some
individuals will occasionally provide information, shelter and material support for the insurgents.
While unorganized, these individuals may show up at rallies supporting the insurgents and will
boycott elections and other activities that could legitimize the government.
20 On insurgent organizational participation, see Petersen, Roger. Resistance and Rebellion: Lessonsfrom Eastern Europe.
Cambridge University Press, 2001, and Lindsey, John, and Roger Petersen. "Varieties of Counterinsurgency: A Case
Study of Iraq." Naval War College. 2011.
Armed local insurgent (-2): Some individuals will adopt a role of direct and organized
participation in a locally based, armed organization. In the absence of a powerful state,
individuals in this role often take the form of local militia members. In the presence of a
powerful state, such individuals may appear as uninvolved citizens by day, but play the role of
active fighter at night. Even the most powerful states can have trouble identifying and
neutralizing actors in this role.
Mobile armed insurgent (-3): Some individuals will join mobile and armed organizations,
becoming members in a guerrilla unit or rebel army. These individuals will fight outside of their
own local communities.
These four roles form one side of a spectrum of participation. At the onset of an occupation or
violent conflict, many individuals will begin at neutrality, but then move into a support role (-1),
and then on into even more committed and violent roles (-2, -3). Of course, individuals may also
move along a parallel set of roles in support of the government. These roles basically mirror
those above.21
If we combine the previously proposed definitions of "insurgent" and "guerrilla," with
the above noted spectrum of insurgent involvement, we may place the "insurgent" at a (-1) -or
possibly (-2), according to degree of participation in armed rebellion- with the "guerrilla" at (-3).
As apparent, individuals at each stage of conflict participation may exist within an organization,
or more broadly across a movement. As opposed to (-1) and (-2) insurgents, perpetrating local,
21 Lindsey, John, and Roger Petersen. Varieties of Counteinsurgency: A Case Study of Iraq. Newport: Naval War College,
2011.
opportunistic acts of guerrilla assistance and/or anti-government violence, fighters belonging to
mobile urban cells and/or rural military units are (-3) guerrillas.2 2
Although the support and occasional armed role of the (-1) and (-2) insurgent will be
noted when considering graduated guerrilla force structure, the primary focus of this thesis will
be on the more organizationally active (-3) guerrilla. This thesis thus aims to build on previous
work studying micro-level insurgent participation. Rather than individuals or larger movements,
however, the unit of analysis will be guerrilla organizations, as they are doctrinally conceived,
and refined across distinct operational environments. 23
22 This division between obstructive, but unarmed (-1) insurgents; lightly armed, but untrained, opportunistic, and local
(-2) militia; and well armed, regimental, and mobile (-3) guerrillas, is usefully illustrated by US counter-sniping efforts in
Iraq. Three classes of guerrilla snipers are described. First, the untrained "pot-shot sniper." This individual may not have
even zeroed his own rifle, and may have got started "with as little as two hours instruction." Although fire from this first
class of Iraqi sniper is only marginally effective, it is regularly concealed by obstructive (-1) insurgents reluctant to
divulge information on sniper identities, or even acknowledge "having heard a shot." The cited study estimates this
category "constitutes half the snipers in Iraq." Second, above the "pot-shot sniper," we find the "trained marksman."
The "trained marksman" is likely a former military or sports shooter, who although a competent shot, lacks sniper
training and experience. This second category is associated with the (-2) "opportunistic neighborhood sniper," who,
operating mostly around where he lives, sees Americans as "a convenient, opportunistic target right in his own
backyard." Often the "trained marksman" is operationally limited by optics and weaponry (Soviet-made 4x PSO-1
mounted to SVD Dragunov or Kalashnikov-derivative [e.g. Romanian PSL, Yugoslav M76, Iraqi Tabruk et al.] sniper
rifles), and lacks an extensive support network. Last, above the (-1, -2) "pot-shot sniper," and (-2) "trained marksman,"
we find the (-3) "one shot one kill" sniper. The "one shot one kill" sniper is a fulltime guerrilla with competent, likely
outside training and/or operational experience in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and other guerrilla fronts. This most
dangerous category may capably target -and win against- Coalition forces. A number of tragically successful attacks
against Coalition officers, Special Forces soldiers, and well-known sniper teams are described. As the above cited target
set demonstrates, each attack required substantial preparation, intelligence, and skill to execute -a mark of the
organizational and logistical sophistication of third-tier (-3) guerrillas, capable of acquiring and fielding, for example,
Austrian-made .50-caliber rifles (Steyr Model 50 HS) smuggled from Iran. Plaster, John. Counter-Snjping in Iraq. Paladin
Press, 2006, chpt. 20.
23 It should be noted that insurgencies are best understood, and indeed often observed as broader movements, in which
multiple organizations may participate. The Iraq insurgency during the Third Gulf War is representative, with distinct
organizations like al-Qa'ida in the Land of Two Rivers (AQI), the Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM), and the Badr Organization,
among others, participating in a wider popular insurgency. A comprehensive study of insurgency as a broader
movement, rather than as comprised of distinct organizations, each meriting in-depth study, is best left to another
analysis. For a taxonomy of Iraqi guerrilla organizations, see "Iraqi Insurgency Groups." Global Security.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraqjinsurgency.htm. For work on insurgency both considering individual
participation, and a more inclusive, popular phenomenon, see Petersen, Roger. Resistance and Rebellion: Lessonsfrom Eastern
Europe. Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Although insurgency, defined as the violent contest between rebel and incumbent for
complete or partial control of territory, 2 4 is better defined, the concept of terrorism is notoriously
nebulous, with as many definitions as scholars and practitioners. However, several elements
prevail across interpretations. Terrorism may be firstly understood as a fundamentally political
project. The utility of an attack is only in its ability to exploitfear. That is, to inflict an
asymmetric psychological impact capable of forcing concessions from a captive audience.
Terrorism, secondly, is essentially violent, with attacks, or threat thereof, primarily directed
against unarmed civilians. For the purposes of this study, terrorism may be defined as a tactic,
centering on the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear, through violence or threat of
violence, directed primarily against unarmed civilians, in the pursuit of political change.2 s
A word on the practitioner of terrorism is in order, with attention to scale and
sophistication of organization. Considered a weapon of the weak, terrorism is associated with
small, often parasitic non-state actors lacking popular representation and power to affect
systemic change. Although guerrilla armies also attack unarmed civilians to extract political
concessions, the guerrilla, unlike the terrorist, operates as a military unit, attacks state military
forces, and captures and holds territory.26 Terrorists, in contrast, avoid direct combat with state
military units, and rarely hold sovereignty over territory.
24 This definition of insurgency is derived in part from Counter-insurgency Field Manual FM-34. An alternative
definition of insurgency, proposed by Fearon and Laitin (2003), characterizes the dominant type of civil war in the post-
World War II era: "[Insurgency] is defined as a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed
bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas." By specifying base of operations, Fearon and Laitin note the
effect of environment on the initiation and successful prosecution of modern insurgency. For the FM-34 definition of
insurgency, see Petraeus, David H., and James F. Amos. "FM-34: Counterinsurgency." Headquarters Department ofthe
Army. 2006, pp. 1-4. For Fearon and Laitin, see Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil
War," American Political Science Review, 97(1). 2003, p. 75.
25 This definition of terrorism is in part derived from Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York: Colombia University
Press. 1998, p. 43.
26 The term "military unit" is deceptively parsimonious; it belies a spectrum of organization type, capability, and size.
This spectrum may begin with small rifle, mortar, and grenade teams, e.g. Somalia's as-Shubaab, and move toward
logistically complex units capable of affecting asymmetric and even conventional warfare, using small and heavy arms,
e.g. Lebanon's Hezbollah.
Thus employing a fundamentally asymmetric tactic, the practitioner of terrorism is likely
a relatively weak, non-state entity, lacking the cadre and capacity to assemble and field more
organizationally sophisticated and logistically capable units. Even at this more general
definitional level, relying on distinctions rather than parsimonious definitions, a relationship
between organizational sophistication, military classification, target choice, and tactics, is
apparent. This thesis will explore the doctrinal and operational relationship between each.
CT or COIN?
As this thesis does not equate insurgents and guerrillas with terrorists, it considers CT and COIN
two separate models of warfare. To this end, COIN may be understood as a competition between
counter-insurgents and insurgents for the loyalty of a population and control of or secession from
the state. Given this definition, the primary strategic objective of COIN is to wrest insurgent
political influence from the population, build the capacity of central and local governments, and
eliminate subversive agents and influence.
As terrorist organizations are generally smaller than guerrilla armies and lack the military
assets and popular support of an insurgency, the primary strategic objective of CT, in contrast, is
cell penetration and network dissolution, with minimal concern as to long-term population-
centric efforts important to COIN. As the counter-terrorist is not facing an enemy that attempts to
seize and hold territory, the counter-terrorist need not concern himself with the resource and
time-intensive COIN project of capturing territory, holding cleared areas, and building state
capacity in order to win the support of the local population. CT is thus a quick, kinetic model of
warfare that involves the systematic targeting and elimination of leaders and operatives deemed
to have only superficial ties with the surrounding community.
Given divergent strategic objectives on issues as fundamental as the use of force, the
methods and capabilities of the expected adversary, conflict duration, and the importance of
population control, protection, and relations, CT and COIN may not only be seen as different
models of warfare, but as having antagonistic objectives that may jeopardize greater mission
success.27 A ruthless and relentless CT targeting campaign may, for example, lack accurate
intelligence informing raids and strikes, resulting in a high level of collateral damage, public
outcry, and a realigned network of militant factions galvanized against a common adversary.
Such results would be counterproductive to a COIN campaign given its fundamental strategic
objectives of population control and protection.
Accordingly, although many of the guerrilla organizations examined in this thesis
resemble CCN in organization and tactics, they will be studied as insurgencies, as defined by
previously specified organizational determinants. Now in practice, this is difficult. Terrorist
organizations often operate within the security vacuum of a greater insurgency [e.g. al-Qa'ida in
Iraq (AQI) and Yemen (AQAP)]. Terrorists also organizationally cross pollinate with indigenous
guerrilla networks [e.g. al-Qa'ida in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and
North West Frontier Province (NWFP)], and strike against counter-insurgents and other symbols
of incumbent legitimacy.2s
Nevertheless, an attempt to appropriately assign -where relevant- the military
classification of case-study violent non-state actor organizations (i.e. insurgent, guerrilla, or
terrorist) should be made. AQI, for example, although considered part of the Iraqi insurgency,
differed greatly in ideology and corresponding tactics from other guerrilla organizations
27 Michael J. Boyle, "Do Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency Go Together?," International Affairs 86(2). 2010, pp.
334-353.
28 Ibid.
operating in Iraqi rural and/or urban asymmetric theatres. 29 The ability of counter-insurgents to
exploit this distinction in organization and tactics, leveraging the ideological and organizational
schism between AQI and hosting Sunni tribal networks -particularly with regard to civilian-
centric attacks- was crucial to the US-led Coalition's defeat of AQI.30 Considering the essential
role of military classification in selecting appropriate CT strategy countering AQI, this thesis will
strive to incorporate this important battlefield lesson throughout its analyses.
Terminology
Finally, terms should be clarified. "Operational environment" refers to the theatre of combat, or
front, classified largely according to physical and human terrain, e.g. rural and/or urban, and
other systemic variables like government control, state capacity, and population density.3 1
"Tactics" refers to practical modes of procedure employed to accomplish second and/or first
order strategic objectives, e.g. HAMAS' targeting of civilian bus riders (tactic) to halt a
perceivably regressive peace deal (second-order strategic objective). "Logistical capacity" refers
to the ability to procure, supply, and maintain shelter, equipment, and personnel, and to plan and
execute operations. "Network" refers to a loosely connected constellation of small cells,
employing varying levels of hierarchy and organization as determined by environmental
constraints. "Multi-front" refers to multiple theatres of operation, including simultaneous rural
and urban campaigns.
29 AQI used terrorist tactics (e.g. suicide bombings), and targeted civilians (e.g. Shi'a Muslims), as opposed to traditional,
military-centric guerrilla strategy and tactics. For a personal letter to AQI head Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi outlining the
rationale and methods for attacking Iraq's Shi'a Muslim majority, see "English Letter Press Release." Director for
National Intelligence. 2005. http://www.dni.gov/pressreleases/letterin-english.pdf.
30 Jones, David Martin, Anne Lane, and Paul Schulte. Terrorism, Securiy, and the Power of Informal Networks. North
Hampton: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 2010, pp. 133 - 152.
31 In the proceeding pages, other definitional variables, like degree of government control, will be explored.
1.3. Data: Sources and Tools
The Uppsala/PRIO ACD provides useful information regarding conflict onset and termination
(dates); severity ["minor" (25-999 battle-related deaths per dyad per annum) - "civil war" (at
least 1,000 battle-related deaths)]; and location (approximate latitude and longitude). ACD will
be supplemented with primary-source Peruvian intelligence reports and SL documents and
directives from the Peruvian insurrection between 1969 - 1989, and relevant secondary source
literature. Additional geospatial information and proxies for variables like government control
(e.g. topography and visible infrastructure) will be obtained through ArcGIS spatial analysis
software and corresponding data sets, and from commercial venues like Google Earth. A
universe of cases, most featuring insurgency, is provided in Appendix II.32
1.4. Scope: Insurgency, Terrorism, Global Trends, and Case Study
Terrorism or Insurgeng?
This thesis is about guerrillas and insurgency and not terrorists and terrorism. Although a
working definition of terrorism is proposed, and organizational characteristics defining its
practitioner are suggested, it will not attempt to explain terrorism as a phenomenon. This thesis
will, however, consider terrorism as a tactic, and how the material constraints of distinct
operational environments may motivate or dissuade its use by guerrilla units.
As primarily a tactic, employed by a range of non-state actor organizations, the use of
terrorist tactics will therefore not be considered definitional of a terrorist organization. Other
32 See Appendix II for a universe of civil wars, many featuring insurgency, compiled by Fearon and Laitin (2006). For
original, see Fearon, James and David Laitin. "Additional Tables for Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." Department of
Political Science, Stanford University. 2006, pp. 7-10.
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variables, like membership, popular support, and logistical capacity are more important
determinants -especially with regard to COIN and/or CT responsive strategy. Prior to the US
retaliatory annihilation of al-Qa'ida's best fighters and assets, for example, what is today
considered the quintessential terrorist group was once closer to a guerrilla organization, fielding
military units against conventional forces in Europe, Africa, and Asia, than the minimally
connected, often amateurish post-9/11 al-Qa'ida affiliate CCN terrorizing the local and
undefended.
Global Trends
This thesis will in part consider the effects of global trends like increasing urbanization,
dissolution of state power, and decline in politically motivated non-state actor violence on
guerrilla organization. The reason for this seemingly digressive discussion is that each of the
above identified global trends may be more broadly classified under the variable of operational
environment. As guerrilla operational environment appears to be the variable most discussed and
considered by scholars and practitioners of guerrilla war alike, and therefore selected as the
independent variable of derived models illustrating the strategic and operational principals of
reviewed doctrine, it would seem worthwhile to consider the potential effects of each.
A comprehensive study of the effects of increasing urbanization, dissolution of state
power, and decline in politically motivated non-state actor violence on guerrilla organization
would however require a separate assessment. As such this thesis is limited to an analysis of
influential guerrilla doctrine only, and what this means for asymmetric conflict today. What for
example increasing urbanization may mean for the relevance of rural-centric guerrilla doctrine
will be considered only in passing. Extrapolating as to what tomorrow will bring, and how that
will change the nature of guerrilla organization and war production, is outside the scope of this
paper. The value of briefly considering the effects of global trends like urbanization is to
however appropriately qualify the conclusions of this thesis, and suggest future research.
Case Study
SL is selected for four reasons. First, SL effectively waged a guerrilla campaign against the
Peruvian government for twenty years. SL therefore had time to refine its model of warfare as
determined by front and adversary. To closely observe the material effects of distinct operational
environments on guerrilla organization and dependent logistical capacity and tactics, it is
important to select a longer standing guerrilla campaign. With lengthy insurgencies, as opposed
to shorter ones, we may better observe how guerrilla organizations change over time, and
possibly identify mechanisms prompting network evolution.
The vaunted SL insurgency, fated to war against state military and police forces for over
two decades, may thus resemble the expected organization and tactics of a rational actor
implementing and discarding theory as dictated by observable material incentives and
constraints. 33 SL network evolution may thereby reflect the shifting topography of systemic
variables determining the organizational structure and dependent logistical capacity of fighting
organizations. A long operational history will accordingly prove useful when attempting a more
inclusive theory modeling the largely unobserved material dynamic relating guerrilla front and
organization.
33 With regard to just how reasonable it is to assume that SL is a rational actor, it is well understood that revolutionary
organizations and movements -especially at the level of the nation-state- discard potentially costly ideology in favor of
more rationally defensible policy as they mature. For words on how revolutionary regimes may be "tamed" with time,
see Saraiva, Jos6 Flivio. "Foreign Policy and Political Regime." Instituto Brasileiro de Relafies Internacionais. 2003, pp. 49 -
50.
Second, the added benefit of observing precisely to what extent doctrine counts in the
face of protracted combat is apparent. As valuable as theory may be to initial organization and
operations, the following stands: No battle plan survives first contact with the enemy.34 SL
commanders did study and hierarchically implement influential guerrilla doctrine.3 5 But they also
modified theory as required to effectively do battle. 36 This simultaneous emphasis on theory and
praxis -which is well documented in captured SL documents and directives, and externally
verifiable by shifting SL attack patterns- may therefore allow us to see not only what guerrilla
theoreticians say, but whether or not guerrilla doctrine reflects the material conditions of war.37
Third, SL operated in rural and urban theatres, using guerrilla and terrorist tactics and
organizational patterns as required. SL operational diversity may thus challenge or compliment
this thesis' derived model, and, by extension, the strategic and operational principals of reviewed
guerrilla doctrine considering the organizational effects of distinct asymmetric theatres. This is
helpful because the inclusion of more than one case study is beyond the modest scope and means
of this thesis. The added value of selecting SL is therefore longitudinal variation in the
independent variable of operational environment. And as will be discussed, this thesis will not
34 Or, as originally quipped by the great 19t century German military strategist Helmuth von Moltke the Elder: "No plan
of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main strength." Moltke, Helmuth, Graf
Von, Militarische Werke. vol. 2, pp. 33-40.
35 As noted by premier SL scholar Gustavo Gorriti, the hierarchical dissemination of SL documents and directives
"permitted an exact distribution of the agreements made to lower levels in the organization without compromising
internal security or the integrity of the political ideas. The precision and organization of the information ensured that
militants who had attended meetings could disseminate the reports without forgetting any of the points, accord each
their proper emphasis and transmit the information from the top of the hierarchy to the bottom without distortion."
Gorriti, Gustavo and Robin Kirk (trans.). The Shining Path:A Histoy of the Millenarian War in Peru. Chapel Hill and
London: University of North Carolina Chapel Hill Press. 1999, p. 22.
36 The SL March 18 plenary session "began with a long methodological reflection from Mao. In addressing the problem
of linking theoretical reflection to praxis, Mao not only emphasized the traditional Marxist affirmation that 'theoretical
knowledge, acquired through practice, should be returned to practice,' but also that 'what is most important is that this
must manifest itself in the jump from rational understanding to revolutionary practice."' The decision of SL
commanders to leave the countryside for the cities -entirely in contradiction to rural-centric Maoist political philosophy-
is an example of how SL was willing to question and modify even its most fundamental tenets. For the March 18 SL
plenary focusing on Mao's revolutionary nexus between theory and praxis, see ibid, p. 23. On the decision of SL
commanders to move to the cities, see Weinstein, Jeremy M. Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. New York:
Cambridge University Press. 2007, p. 88.
37 Criteria for manual selection will be presented in section II.
only explore the impact of terrain-based determinants of operational environment, but of
important global trends like increasing urbanization and dissolution of state power that affect
insurgent organizational preferences and dependent logistical capacity. SL operated over periods
of both low and high urbanization, in mountains, jungles, and cities, and pushed the Peruvian
state to near collapse. Accordingly, this thesis is not limited to a study of only one set of systemic
variables directing organizational evolution.
Despite useful variation in the independent variable, a narrow focus on SL may
nevertheless limit the external validity of this thesis. Future work would do well to evaluate its
findings against additional cases, especially sustained urban insurgency. Data availability and
collection are however problems in insurgency and civil war studies. So information is the fourth
benefit of selecting SL. Following the capture of SL leadership, Peruvian intelligence, military,
and police officers conducted thousands of interrogations and collected a wealth of documents
and directives outlining SL doctrine, tactics, and organization. Called the "bedrock of SL military
strategy," the captured SL central archives were once a classified battlefield spoil of Peru's
National Intelligence Service (NIS). 38 Today, they are available in microfilm to scholars at
Princeton University Library. 39 In addition to a supplementary collection of declassified Peruvian
military and NIS reports, 40 the SL central archives will inform the presented case study. One well
41documented case study may thus be as useful as several less so.
38 Gorriti, Gustavo and Robin Kirk (trans.). The Shining Path: A History of the Millenanan War in Peru. Chapel Hill and
London: University of North Carolina Chapel Hill Press. 1999, pp. xvi - xvii.
39 A large collection of primary-source reports from the Peruvian civil war are today available in microfilm at the
Princeton University library. Specifically, the 1st and 2nd collections of ephemera from the Peruvian insurrection (8 and 4
reels, respectively), and the Sendero Luminoso collection of pamphlets, serials, fliers, and party congresses from 1962 to
1985 (3 reels).
40 Ibid., 2nd collection of ephemera from the Peruvian insurrection.
41 A brief word on translation: All primary source material is in the original Spanish. Throughout, the author strives to
provide a close translation of relevant passages. As all translation is however performed by the author only, all errors in
word, intent, and meaning, are accordingly his.
Not many insurgencies share the above noted, especially fortunate case-study
characteristics with SL. Consider Appendix II, which provides a list of civil wars featuring
insurgency.4 Less than a fifth of identified insurgencies last anywhere near as long as SL. And of
these, only two, i.e. the IRA and FARC, share SL 's attractive case-study attributes of (1) an
emphasis on the implementation and refinement of guerrilla doctrine; (2) operational diversity
over human and physical terrain; and (3) accessible, high-quality primary-source data. An
extended version of this thesis may include the IRA, FARC, and even pre and post-9/1 1 al-
Qa'ida as additional case-study organizations. In the meantime, SL should provide a useful
starting point.
42 Civil war is defined as "fighting reaching a threshold of 1,000 deaths between governments and organized groups
seeking either to control the state or separate from it." This definition is proposed by Fearon and Laitin. See Fearon,
James and David Laitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War Research Project." Department of Political Science, Stanford
University. http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/.
II. Guerrilla Doctrine: Network Structure and Multi-Front Insurgency
"Though geographical and social conditions in each country determine the mode and particular
forms that guerrilla warfare will take, there are laws that hold for all fighting of this type."
Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, 1969
This section will present a review of influential guerrilla doctrine. The criteria for manual
selection is twofold. First, to include only mature theory as closely reflective of battlefield
conditions as possible, this study will limit its review to doctrine developed by maj or guerrilla
practitioners involved in longstanding campaigns, irrespective of victor, only.
Second, to maximize the external validity of this study, manuals with the greatest cross-
conflict doctrinal impact will be selected. For example, the "Mini-manual of the Urban
Guerrilla" (Marighella 1971), is possibly the most widely read guerrilla manual in modern
history. The mini-manual served as the official guidebook of the Italian Red Brigades, the
German Red Army Faction, and the Irish Republican Army. Together with the doctrine of
Ernesto "Che" Guevara, it "has informed virtually all Latin American insurgent terrorists for the
last twenty-five years." 43 Considering the extensive doctrinal influence and theoretical cross-
pollination of each examined theoretician and manuscript, the admonishments of each will be
treated as largely equivalent.44
43 Mahan, Sue and Pamala L. Griset. Terrorism in Perspective. London: Sage Publications. 2006, p. 43. See also Stohl,
Michael. The Politics of Terrorism. New York: Michael Dekker Inc. 1988, p. 505.
44 The writings of Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Abimael Guzman -even al-Qa'ida's al-Muqrin- were heavily influenced by
Mao Tse Tung. Moreover, manuals explicitly refer to other well-known writings and theoreticians, citing, critiquing,
developing, and borrowing strategy and tactics wherever possible. Uruguayan revolutionary Abraham Guill6n, for
example, even wrote the introduction to the Uruguayan edition of Guevara's "Guerrilla Warfare." For the influence of
Maoist guerrilla strategy on Guevara, Guzman, and al-Muqrin, see Guevara, Ernesto. Guerrilla Warfare. 1969, chpt. 1;
"The Myth of Guzman." Time CNN. 1992; al-Muqrin, 'Abd al-'Aziz and Norman Cigar (trans.). Al-Qa'ida's Doctrinefor
Insurgeny: A Practical Coursefor Guerrilla War. Washington DC: Potomac Books. 2004, pp. 12, 13, 18-20, 22, 31, 44, 51.
Five manuals and doctrinal works will be examined, including: "On Guerrilla Warfare"
(Tse-Tung 1937); "Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla" (Guillen 1966); "Guerrilla Warfare"
(Guevara 1969); "Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla" (Marighella 1971); and "A Practical
Course for Guerrilla War" (al-Muqrin ca. 2004). Guidebook lessons on (1) operational
environment, (2) organizational structure, (3) logistical capacity, and (4) dependent tactics and
military classification, will be considered.
11.1. Operational Environment
Rural or Urban Insurgeng?
The question of operational environment is a consistent point of debate and consideration in each
manual. Longitudinally, advisements on operational environment moved from primafacie tenets
of dialectical-materialist theory, positing rural theatres as the preferred base for insurgency (Mao
1937; Guevara 1969), to more practical and/or Marxist-Leninist revisionist doctrine considering
urban centers as optimal loci of rebellion should rural mobilization prove fruitless (Guillen 1966;
Marighella 1971).
Similar to COIN scholarship, despite the often binary emphasis of some guerrilla
theoreticians on either rural or urban operational environments (Mao 1937; Guevara 1969;
Guillen 1966; Marighella 1971), recent doctrine develops and expounds a sophisticated range of
non-state actor modes of war production, consisting of an inter and/or intra-organizational
spectrum of optimal network structure as a function of operational environment, e.g. rural and/or
urban (al-Muqrin ca. 2004). This shift in operational focus reflects the ongoing trend of
migration from rural to urban centers, as well as a progressive refinement of guerrilla thought
expounding a multi-front model of insurgency.
Regarding rural theatres, Mao Tse-Tung, in contrast to Marxist-Leninist dogma,
considered the Chinese industrial proletariat too weak and few in number to successfully revolt.
Having disastrously failed to establish an urban guerrilla network in Nationalist-controlled
Shanghai in 1927,45 Mao built a rural insurgent army in Ching Kang Shan, a mountainous region
in the Fukien-Kiangsi borderlands. Mao used this army to launch a three-phase guerrilla war,
which he formulated as (1) Organization, Consolidation, and Preservation; (2) Progressive
Expansion (Guerrilla War); and (3) Destruction of the Enemy (Conventional War). As Phase I
guerrilla operations gradually expanded from secure mountain strongholds to engage and defeat
government forces in Phase 1I and III guerrilla and conventional war, Mao would establish a
doctrinal link between operational environment, i.e. concealing terrain outside government
control, and the revolutionary potential of attached rural populations.46
Drawing heavily from Maoist revolutionary doctrine, Ernesto "Che" Guevara similarly
advances a phased, rural-centric guerrilla strategy in his treatise "Guerrilla Warfare." Although
Guevara acknowledges that "the struggle of organized city workers should not be underrated,"47
he considers urban and suburban operational environments to be unfavorable, and as centers of
government control, hazardous. Citing Mao and Ho Chi Minh, Guevara theorizes that as the
economic aim of the proletariat revolution is primarily driven by the aspiration to own land, "the
4 The National Revolutionary Army (NRA) of Chiang Kai-shek reached the outskirts of Shanghai in March of 1927. By
April, Chiang's secret police had arrested and executed radical labor leaders and purged the NRA of communist agents.
Soviet advisors abandoned Shanghai and the red Wuhan government (estd. 1926) dissolved. Tse-Tung, Mao and Samuel
B. Griffith II (trans.). On Guerrilla Warfare. Chicago: University of Illinois Press (reprinted). 1961, p. 15.
46 Mao's strategy for guerrilla war is phased. Mao's three phases of guerrilla war are: (1) Organization, Consolidation, and
Preservation, consisting of surviving government anti-guerrilla campaigns and securing bases of operation outside
government control; (2) Progressive Expansion (Terrorism-Guerrilla War), consisting of guerrilla and terrorist
operations against government forces, as areas of control expand, and (3) Destruction of the Enemy (Conventional
War), consisting of a transition to conventional war to capture control of the state. Ibid., pp. 20-26.
47 Guevara, Che. Guerrilla Warfare. 1969, p. 3.
guerrilla fighter is above all an agrarian revolutionary."48 Guevara thus posits rural bases of
insurgency as a strategic consideration, in addition to a doctrinal necessity.
Brazilian urban guerrilla Carlos Marighella, and Spanish revolutionary theoretician
Abraham Guillen, leave the jungle for the city. First, Marighella considers cities essential foci of
rebellion because of a greater (1) density of targets, e.g. foreign agents and government police
and military forces, and (2) availability of financial resources open to guerrilla assault and
expropriation, including foreign firms and banking and financial services sectors. 49 What was
once a military-centric target set, thus expands to include civilian production and foreign
nationals/firms. The initiative of attacking units is paramount; Marighella urges the urban
guerrilla to shatter citizen confidence in government through an unrelenting campaign of
psychological warfare, employing robbery, assassination, sabotage, and terrorism.5 0
Guillen concurs with Marighella's assessment stressing the strategic and revolutionary
primacy of cities and urban proletariat, writing that because of the capitalist accumulation and
centralization of capital and population in urban centers, "a revolutionary war must be initiated in
the cities [emphasis added]."' Unlike Marighella, however, Guillen neither considers civilian
production, enabled by foreign banking and financial services, nor unarmed state and/or foreign
48 Ibid.
49 Brazilian urban guerrillas following Marighella's doctrine robbed hundreds of banks. This range of target selection
stems from what Marighella considered the two "essential objectives" of urban guerrilla warfare. He writes "Within the
framework of the class struggle, as it inevitably and necessarily sharpens, the armed struggle of the urban guerrilla points
toward two essential objectives: (a) the physical liquidation of the chiefs and assistants of the armed forces and of the
police; (b) the expropriation of government resources and those belonging to the big capitalists, latifundists, and
imperialists, with small expropriations used for the maintenance of individual urban guerrillas and larges ones for the
sustenance of the revolution itself." Throughout "Mini-manual" Marighella urges that banks and other lootable
franchises be targeted. Marighella, Carlos. Mini-manual of the Urban Guerrilla. 1971, p. 6.
50 Terrorism, sabotage, execution, assassination, strikes, propaganda -all are considered acceptable and necessary tools of
the urban guerrilla, according to Marighella. There is to minimal centralization of command, and as much operational
flexibility as possible. Ibid., pp. 1-29.
51 Ibid., p. 257.
agents, politically productive targets.52 Although Guillen acknowledges the importance of rural
food production,5 3 Guillen believes Mao could not have assembled a mountain army without
having first recruited cadre and equipment from Shanghai, and considers Guevara's misguided,
rural-focused theory of revolution to be the cause of his demise in Bolivia.54
Unwedded to a particular interpretation of Maoist and/or Marxist-Leninist revolutionary
theory emphasizing the revolutionary potential of either the rural or urban proletariat, al-Qa'ida
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) theorist 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Muqrin presents a more fluid theory
of optimal operational environment.5 5 The primary strategic consideration, according to al-
Muqrin, lies not with primafacie social theory, but with a comprehensive, case-by-case
assessment of the material advantages of distinct operational environments. Different theatres of
operation may thus occur inter-nationally (e.g. Egypt [urban] vs. Afghanistan [rural]) or intra-
nationally (e.g. Baghdad [urban] vs. al-Anbar Province [rural]), with availability and state
56 1bae
control of potential fronts the only consideration. Rural bases that are "easily defensible for a
52 Guill6n served as the mentor for Uruguay's leftist revolutionary movement Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN),
more commonly known as Tupamaros, after Incan revolutionary Tdpac Amaru II. In his work "Strategy of an Urban
Guerrilla," Guill6n admonishes Tupamoro operatives for having kidnapped and executed suspected CIA agent Dan
Mitrione, and for widespread Marighella-esque looting of banks, writing "the Tupamaros not only failed to accomplish a
political objective, but also suffered a political reversal in their newly acquired role of assassins -the image they acquired
through hostile mass media.. .The Tupamaros are perilously close to resembling a political Mafia. In demanding large
sums of money in ransom for political hostages they have sometimes appeared to be self-serving." Guill6n, Abraham
and Donald C. Hodges (trans.). Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla: The Revolutionary Writings ofAbraham Guillin. New York:
William Morrow & Company, Inc. 1973, pp. 270-271.
53 Guillen notes "The countryside, however, can subsist for a longer period of time without manufactured goods from
the cities. Consequently, not even in those countries with a high percentage of urban population is an effective strategy
possible without including the countryside. Cooperation between the laborer and the peasant is essential to the
revolution." Ibid., p. 239.
54 Ibid., pp. 255-257.
5 Al-Muqrin writes, "The types of guerrilla war are to be based on the type of terrain on which the operations are
conducted. For example, I cannot conduct mountain warfare in the Najd. However, there are some countries that have a
variety of terrain features (mountains, woods and forests, swamps, cities) and it is then possible in such countries to
conduct operations in the first-mentioned sector (mountains), which is what happened, in fact, in several countries,
including Chechnya, Afghanistan, and the Philippines. If, on the other hand, in a specific country you do not have any
appropriate areas for operations, such as mountains or forests, you must make do with urban forces." Al-Muqrin, 'Abd
al-'Aziz and Norman Cigar (trans.). Al-Qaida's Doctrine for Insurgency: A Practical Course for Guerrilla War. Washington DC:
Potomac Books. 2004, p. 126.
56 Ibid., p. 126.
period sufficient to carry out an exfiltration of forces," and in an area "where there is ample
cover and concealment," are considered optimal.57
Although al-Muqrin, explicitly influenced by Clausewitz and Mao, advises a three-phase
guerrilla war proceeding from rural strongholds, 5 8 he suggests rural operations occur alongside
urban attacks in multi-front guerrilla war. For urban operations, al-Muqrin proposes a Marighella
model of decentralized urban warfare and terrorism, targeting regime forces, in addition to
unarmed civilians/foreign elements, including Jews, Christians, Westerners and apostates -albeit
employing strict unit discipline. 59 Unlike Guillen, however, al-Muqrin does not consider the
adverse strategic consequences of civilian-centric terrorism.
With the phenomenon of urbanization increasing through the middle of the twentieth
century, there is thus a notable shift in guerrilla doctrine from Maoist, rural insurgent theory,
toward traditional Marxist-Leninist dogma emphasizing the revolutionary potential of the
industrial proletariat. And in at least one example of urban guerrilla doctrine, this shift in
operational environment entails an expansion of target set to include civilian production and
unarmed imperialist agents. AQAP theorist al-Muqrin manages to synthesize Maoist and urban
guerrilla theory, presenting a multi-front model of asymmetric warfare, dependent only on the
material constraints of a given conflict. Yet how must guerrilla units organize themselves in each
theatre, and what effect may this organization have on logistical capacity and tactics?
57 Ibid., pp. 114-115.
58 Ibid., pp. 94 - 100.
59 Al-Muqrin, when discussing urban guerrilla objectives, ranks human targets according to religion (or assumed lack
thereof) and nationality: (1) Jews (further subdivided according to nationality, with Israelis, Americans, Britons, and
other Occidentals prioritized); (2) Christians (similarly subdivided according to nationality, with Americans, Britons,
Spaniards, and Australians prioritized); and (3) apostates (subdivided between "those who are close to the Jewish and
Christian governments... such as Hosni Mubarak and the rulers of the Arabian Peninsula and their advisers," innovators
and secularists "who spread corruption among the believers," and spies and intelligence agents "who are the armor and
shield of the Jews and the Christians, and the striking fist of the Apostate rulers." Ibid., pp. 129 - 131.
11.2. Organizational Structure
RuralArmies and Urban Networks
The guerrilla army Mao sought to create was a sophisticated hierarchical enterprise, dependent
on broad popular support. 60 Although explicitly distinguishing more decentralized guerrilla units
from pyramidal conventional forces,61 Mao's advisement for the organization of guerrilla forces
in rural terrain proceeds from nine-man units, to ~1,000 man regiments under a "centralized
strategic command [charged with] the general management of all guerrilla units, their
coordination within warzones, and the general policy regarding guerrilla base areas." 62
This hierarchical command structure enabled Mao's forces to organize a three-phase
guerrilla war. 63 A well delineated chain of command maintained unit cohesion, and enforced
proper troop conduct necessary for popular support (Appendix I).64 Throughout, Mao stresses the
importance of rugged, concealing terrain, necessary to effectively abscond such noticeable
physical and organizational assets, consisting of thousands of men and light weapons. 65 It is thus
apparent, in Maoist guerrilla theory, that a principal advantage of rough terrain is the opportunity
to build and field large, hierarchical, and logistically capable guerrilla military units. No
admonishment is given to urban organization.
60 Ibid., p. 45-48, Appendix I.
61 Ibid., p. 52.
62 Ibid., pp. 75-80; p. 114.
63 Ibid., pp. 20-22.
64 On guerrilla discipline and interactions with local populations, Mao remarks "There is also a unity of spirit that should
exist between troops and local inhabitants. The Eight Route Army put into practice a code known as "The Three Rules
and the Eight Remarks," listed here: Rules: (1) All actions are subject to command. (2) Do not steal from the people. (3)
Be neither selfish nor unjust. Remarks- (1) Replace the door when you leave the house. (2) Roll up the bedding on which
you have slept. (3) Be courteous. (4) Be honest in your transactions. (5) Return what you borrow. (6) Replace what you
break. (7) Do not bathe in the presence of women. (8) Do not without authority search the pocketbooks of those you
arrest. Ibid., p. 92.
65 On optimal operational environment, Mao comments "Guerrilla bases may be classified according to their location as:
first, mountain bases; second, plains bases; and, last, river, lake, and bay bases. The advantages of bases in mountainous
areas are evident.. .these bases are strongly protected." Units proceed as follows: squad (9-11 men), company (12 x 11-
man squad), battalion (4 x company), and regiment (3 x battalion). Ibid., p. 110.
Guevara similarly stresses the salience of concealing rural terrain and popular support
vis-A-vis optimal organizational structure and dependent logistical capacity. 66 Although not
nearly as explicit as Mao regarding rural insurgent force structure, Guevara suggests a rural
guerrilla unit consist of ~25 men, armed with small arms (e.g. "Browning, Belgian FAL, and M-
14 automatic rifles") and light anti-tank weapons.67 The rural insurgent structure is thus more
akin to a conventional army unit than, as we shall discover, their urban guerrilla comrades.
When considering "unfavorable" suburban/urban guerrilla operations, Guevara advises a
force of "at most four to five men," citing the security challenges of urban operations in
government-controlled city centers. 68 Smaller urban guerrilla units are to be armed with at most
"weapons for self-defense... .[and] no more than one carbine, with pistols for the other
members." 69 This prescribed force reduction at the unit level -and apparent logistical capacity
considering the corresponding reduction in allocated weaponry- is at once intuitive, and striking.
Yet despite a polar focus with regard to advised operational environment, fellow
revolutionary Guillen suggests a similar allocation of small, mobile four-member cells "that live
separately and fight together" for clandestine urban operations. 70 As Guevara, Guillen cites the
operational hazards of government-held cities as motive for a smaller force allocation. With
66 On the preference of rural to urban theatres, Guevara writes "It ought to be noted by those who maintain
dogmatically that the struggle of the masses is centered in city movements, entirely forgetting the immense participation
of the country people in the life of all the underdeveloped parts of America. Of course, the struggles of the city masses
of organized workers should not be underrated; but their real possibilities of engaging in armed struggle must be
carefully analyzed where the guarantees which customarily adorn our constitutions are suspended or ignored. In these
conditions the illegal workers' movements face enormous dangers. They must function secretly without arms. The
situation in the open country is not so difficult. There, in places beyond the reach of the repressive forces, the
inhabitants can be supported by the armed guerrillas. Guevara, Che. Guerilla Warfare. 1969, chpt. 1.
67 Ibid., chpt. 4.
68 Explaining the precipitous reduction in force requirements when moving from rural to urban environments, Guevara
notes: "...The suburban guerrilla must be considered as situated in exceptionally unfavorable ground, where the
vigilance of the enemy will be much greater and the possibilities of reprisals as well as of betrayal are increased
enormously. Another aggravating circumstance is that the suburban guerrilla band cannot depart far from the places
where it is going to operate...and the need to remain totally hidden during the daytime." Ibid., chpt. 6.
69 Ibid.
70 Guillen, Abraham and Donald C. Hodges (trans.). Philosophy of the Urban Guerilla: The Revolutionay Wriings ofAbraham
Guillin. New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc. 1973, p. 240.
regard to organizational structure, both Guevara and Guillen imply an inter and intra-unit
hierarchy across horizontally organized urban cells. In both manuals, although four-man cells are
not to communicate horizontally, they are to maintain tight security -ensured by a cell captain-
and operational discipline -executing attacks only as ordered by division commanders located
outside the immediate area of operations.7 1 Marighella is an outlier; as he advises the urban
guerrilla to strike often and with no outside direction, engineering state collapse through
manufactured anarchy, only intra-cell hierarchy is considered.72
Al-Muqrin, expectedly considering his synthesis of rural and urban modes of guerrilla
organization, proposes a force structure explicitly modeled after a hierarchical Maoist guerrilla
army for rural theatres, and a cell network resembling the Guevara-Guillen model of urban
insurgency for city work (Appendix I). For mountain forces, al-Muqrin suggests nine to twelve-
man squads, moving to three-squad platoons of twenty-seven to thirty-six men; three-platoon
companies of 100 - 150 men; four-company battalions of 300 - 450 men; four-battalion brigades
of 1,200 - 1,800 men; and four-brigade divisions of 4,800 - 7,200 men.73 Each squad receives
71 Regarding cell discipline, Guevara writes "It is fundamental to recognize that a suburban guerrilla band can never
spring up of its own accord. It will be born only after certain conditions necessary for its survival have been created.
Therefore, the suburban guerrilla will always be under the direct orders of chiefs located in another zone. The function
of this guerrilla band will not be to carry out independent actions but to coordinate its activities with overall strategic
plans in such a way as to support the action of larger groups situated in another area, contributing specifically to the
success of a fixed tactical objective, without the operational freedom of guerrilla bands of the other types. For example, a
suburban band will not be able to choose among the operations of destroying telephone lines, moving to make attacks in
another locality, and surprising a patrol of soldiers on a distant road; it will do exactly what it is told... If there is more
than one guerrilla band, they will all be under a single chief who will give orders as to the necessary tasks through
contacts of proven trustworthiness who live openly as ordinary citizens." Guill6n is less explicit, yet nonetheless
emphasizes the importance of cell-level discipline, especially necessary for appropriate relations with the population.
Through this advisement on intra-cell discipline, and open critique of Marighella's decentralized model of urban guerrilla
warfare, Guill6n implies a degree of hierarchy within units, and across the urban network. On Che's admonishments, see
Guevara, Ernesto. Guerrlla Warfare. 1969, chpt. 6. For Guill6n, see Guill6n, Abraham and Donald C. Hodges (trans.).
Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla: The Revolutionay Wtriings ofAbraham Guillin. New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc.
1973, pp. 240-241.
72 Marighella, Carlos. Mini-manual of the Urban Guerrilla. 1971, pp. 1-29.
73 Al-Muqrin, 'Abd al-'Aziz and Norman Cigar (trans.). Al-Qa'ida's Doctrinefor Insurgeng: A Practical Coursefor Guerrilla
War. Washington DC: Potomac Books. 2004, pp. 110 - 115.
orders from a unit captain and deputy, who responds to an area commander. Squad armament is
prodigious; a comprehensive assortment of weaponry is allocated to engage military units.74
Moving to urban operational environments, al-Muqrin advises urban units to exceed "not
more than four," organized hierarchically, in a "pyramid force structure," or in a horizontal
chain, "like a set of worry beads."7 5 Teams are to consist of (1) command, (2) intelligence
collection, (3) logistics, and (4) assault elements.76 Each cell element is to be aggressively
compartmentalized.77 Only the organization's "best personnel in terms of education,
sophistication, and training," warns al-Muqrin, are to be selected for operations in cities "full of
eyes" -a nod to the operational hazards of government-controlled cities.78 Equipment is not to
exceed anything that cannot be safely hidden in a rented apartment or dead drop.79
This structural dichotomy, prescribed as dictated by operational environment, is
reinforced at its doctrinal extremes (Mao [rural-centric] vs. Guillen [urban-centric]); observed as
a fluid spectrum with Guevara's description of preferred rural and urban force allocations; and
fully refined with al-Muqrin's detailed itemization of required rural army equipment and optimal
urban-guerrilla network structure. As apparent, such drastically dissimilar organizational
structures and equipment allocations -moving from heavily armed rural armies, to minimally
74 Al-Muqrin lists squad level armament as follows: 9 x Kalashnikov (2,700 rounds 7.62 x 39); 1 x designated marksman
rifle (150 rounds 7.62 x 54); 1 x PKM general purpose machine gun (1,000 rounds 7.62 x 54); 1 x rocket-propelled
grenade launcher (RPG) (10 x rocket); 2 x pistols (N/A). Additional equipment (e.g. grenades, binoculars, GPS, shovels,
cellphones, etc.) is also itemized. Ibid., pp. 112 - 114.
7 5 Ibid., pp. 120 - 121.
76 Ibid.
77 On team compartmentalization, al-Muqrin notes: "There is an error that mostjihadi groups have fallen into, namely
that an individual in the organization knows everything about the organization, including its secret affairs... Instead, the
one who collects the intelligence should not know what the target is by collecting the intelligence about an individual or
installation. Nor should he know how the operation is to be carried out, nor the means to be used in the operation or
how they are to be brought to the operation's location. Likewise, the logistician should not know why certain weapons
were collected or why certain explosives are being prepared." Ibid., p. 120.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., pp. 122 - 125.
equipped urban-cell networks- are likely to affect the logistical capacity and dependent tactics of
units fighting in different theatres.
11.3. Logistical Capacity, Dependent Tactics, and Military Classification
Guerrilla or Terrorist?
As alluded in the foregoing analysis, Mao organized guerrilla war proceeding in three phases. A
more comprehensive overview of each, applying a spectrum of insurgent participation presented
previously, may be useful. The first phase is devoted to the "organization, consolidation, and
preservation" 80 of local (-2) guerrilla bases in terrain outside government control, where
volunteers are trained, indoctrinated, and dispatched to enlist the support of the surrounding
countryside, weaving a protective belt of (-1) "sympathizers willing to supply food, recruits and
information."81 The Phase I guerrilla's purpose is to survive, and grow stronger, while avoiding
infiltration and direct attack from a still strong state. 82
The second phase is devoted to direct-action operations, increasing in tempo and scope as
state power deteriorates. Descending (-2) local mountain units conduct sabotage, assassination,
and terrorist attacks against "spies," "reactionaries," and "enemies of the revolution," ambushing
weak columns and vulnerable police outposts for the procurement of arms, ammunition, medical
supplies, and communications equipment. 83 As the (-2) mountain guerrilla becomes better
equipped and logistically capable, an increasing percentage of units begin the transformation to a
80 Tse-Tung, Mao and Samuel B. Griffith II (trans.). On Guernilla Warfare. Chicago: University of Illinois Press (reprinted).
1961, p. 20.
81 Ibid.
82 As will be demonstrated, the question of state power, reasonably proxied by terrain, is central to guerrilla capacity to
organize.
83 Ibid.
(-3) conventional establishment capable of engaging the enemy near and far, entering Phase III:
Destruction of the Enemy (Conventional War).84
Thus doctrinally -as well as in practice- the availability of sanctuary, afforded by rough
terrain outside state control, allowed Mao's guerrillas to gradually grow in numbers and
capacity. Communist forces progressed from small, local (-2) sabotage and terrorist units, to a
mobile, logistically capable, hierarchical (-3) military-centric force, equipped with a full range of
weapons and equipment. Mao's inclusion of non-military targets (e.g. spies, reactionaries, and
enemies of the revolution) at an earlier stage of organizational development (Phase II), is
noteworthy; it suggests, considering the military-centric focus of Phase III, an accompanying
shift in primary target set, occurring alongside organizational evolution.
Both Guevara and al-Muqrin imply an almost identical degree of logistical capacity
afforded to (-3) mountain forces, i.e. the capacity to maneuver, engage, and destroy large, well-
armed state-military units. The effect of fielding a more capable, hierarchically organized
mountain force on prescribed guerrilla tactics, target set, and resulting military classification, is
apparent. Guevara advises a strategy of attrition, gradually wearing down government military
forces through hit-and-run tactics, including partial encirclement, and day/night raids.85 Al-
84 Ibid.
85 Guevara refers to a tactic, for example, called "the minuet," as well as other possible engagement tactics:
"Characteristic of this war of mobility is the so-called minuet, named from the analogy with the dance: the guerrilla
bands encircle an enemy position, an advancing column, for example; they encircle it completely from the four points of
the compass, with five or six men in each place, far enough away to avoid being encircled themselves; the fight is started
at any one of the points, and the army moves toward it; the guerrilla band then retreats, always maintaining visual
contact, and initiates its attack from another point. The army will repeat its action and the guerrilla band, the same. Thus,
successively, it is possible to keep an enemy column immobilized, forcing it to expend large quantities of ammunition
and weakening the morale of its troops without incurring great dangers....This same tactic can be applied at nighttime,
closing in more and showing greater aggressiveness, because in these conditions counter- encirclement is much more
difficult. Movement by night is another important characteristic of the guerrilla band, enabling it to advance into
position for an attack and, where the danger of betrayal exists, to mobilize in new territory. The numerical inferiority of
the guerrilla makes it necessary that attacks always be carried out by surprise; this great advantage is what permits the
guerrilla fighter to inflict losses on the enemy without suffering losses." Guevara, Ernesto. Guerrilla Warfare. 1969, chpt.
4.
Muqrin notes (-3) Phase III forces will "be completely familiar with conventional war," 86 and
may begin "attacking smaller cities... [for] as the enemy sees the fall of cities into the
mujahidin's hands, [his] morale will collapse.'87 Logistically complex attacks -the raid and
ambush- are explained in detail.88 The Guevara - al-Muqrin model of mountain/rural warfare is
invariably military centric, with no mention of attacks against civilians during Phase III
operations.
If numerous, well-equipped, hierarchically organized, (-3) mountain forces, operating in
rough, concealing terrain, are tasked with the logistically challenging task of destroying a
superior military force, how may small, hermetic, lightly armed urban cells operate? Guevara,
Marighella, and Guillen suggest a tellingly similar mode of operation. For Marighella, smaller
urban units may only defeat government forces through an indiscriminate sabotage and terror
campaign.89 The Guevara - Guillen model of urban guerrilla warfare places a far greater
emphasis on unit discipline, eschewing politically counter-productive acts of terrorism; however,
advised tactics emphasize sabotage, and a campaign of sporadic attacks against state forces. 90
86 On familiarity with conventional war, al-Muqrin writes: "During the preceding phase, the mujahidin were able to create
conventional-like forces that will be transformed gradually into conventional forces with modern units. By "modern" I
mean that they will be completely familiar with conventional war and with an army's order of battle and how it operates
in the field. [These units] will not be used as is the case with those military regimes and military tribunals, and ape the
infidel West in ways that everyone knows. However, the mujahidin must also retain guerrilla fighters." Al-Muqrin, 'Abd
al-'Aziz and Norman Cigar (trans.). Al-Qa'ida's Doctrine for Insurgency: A Practical Coursefor Guerrilla War. Washington DC:
Potomac Books. 2004, p. 101.
87 Al-Muqrin's "city-hopping" strategy follows the strategy of Afghan mujahidin: 'After Khost fell, and then Gardez, into
the mujabadin's hands, and then one city after the other followed, culminating in the fall of Kabul." Ibid.
88 The ambush formation al-Muqrin suggests bears a striking resemblance to Guevara's "minuet:" "The ambush force
splits into four units, each one of which takes a position along four specified geographic directions, where they hunker
down to await the enemy. When the enemy comes upon one of these units, the latter proceeds to open fire, and if
attacked, withdraws while another unit hits the enemy with fire. The four units alternate with attacks and withdrawals
until the enemy's morale collapses and the latter becomes fixed in one spot, making him easy prey in the end for the
ambush. The time of day is not important in carrying out this mission, as it could be either at night, or during the
daytime, but the distances should be reduced if this maneuver is carried out at night. The ambush force is split into two,
in the shape of an L, and both detachments should be prepared to attack if the enemy falls into the ambush. In this type
of ambush, it is especially important to de-conflict fires." Ibid., p. 118.
89 Marighella, Carlos. Mini-manual of the Urban Guerrilla. 1971, pp. 1-29.
90Regarding urban tactics and organization, Guevara advises: "The essential qualities of the guerrilla fighter in this
situation are discipline (perhaps in the highest degree of all) and discretion. He cannot count on more than two or three
friendly houses that will provide food; it is almost certain that an encirclement in these conditions will be equivalent to
Although only under the most desperate of circumstances do Guevara and Guillen advise
terrorism, an essential element of terrorism is explicitly apparent: The compensation for an
imposed numerical inferiority, by maximizing the psychological impact of an operation.
Al-Muqrin synthesizes the operational discipline of Guevara and Guillen, with the
savagery of Marighella. As discussed, al-Muqrin considers small, compartmentalized cells to be
optimal modes of urban operation. Yet throughout, terrorism is considered afundamental tool of
the urban guerrilla. The target of the urban guerrilla, according to al-Muqrin, is considered
diplomatic-military, [with] "a political meaning connected to the nature of the ideological
struggle; that is, it is considered the way to send messages to multiple audiences." 91 Al-Muqrin
then presents a discussion on optimal human targets -invariably unarmed- and assassination,
hostage taking, and urban combat techniques using light-weapons and explosives. 92
A pattern is evident. Although al-Muqrin considers urban units, as Guevara and Guillkn,
logistically capable of undertaking relatively complex assassination, hostage taking, and
sabotage operations, at no point does urban unit complexity of operations and organization
death. Weapons, furthermore, will not be of the same kind as those of the other groups. They will be for personal
defense, of the type that do not hinder a rapid flight or betray a secure hiding place. As their armament the band ought
to have not more than one carbine or one sawed-off shotgun, or perhaps two, with pistols for the other members. They
will concentrate their action on prescribed sabotage and never carry out armed attacks, except by surprising one or two
members or agents of the enemy troops." On terrorism, Guevara warns: "Acts of sabotage are very important. It is
necessary to distinguish clearly between sabotage, a revolutionary and highly effective method of warfare, and terrorism,
a measure that is generally ineffective and indiscriminate in its results, since it often makes victims of innocent people
and destroys a large number of lives that would be valuable to the revolution. Terrorism should be considered a valuable
tactic when it is used to put to death some noted leader of the oppressing forces well known for his cruelty, his
efficiency in repression, or other quality that makes his elimination useful. But the killing of persons of small importance
is never advisable, since it brings on an increase of reprisals, including deaths. There is one point very much in
controversy in opinions about terrorism. Many consider that its use, by provoking police oppression, hinders all more or
less legal or semi-clandestine contact with the masses and makes impossible unification for actions that will be necessary
at a critical moment. This is correct; but it also happens that in a civil war the repression by the governmental power in
certain towns is already so great that, in fact, every type of legal action is suppressed already, and any action of the
masses that is not supported by arms is impossible. It is therefore necessary to be circumspect in adopting methods of
this type and to consider the consequences that they may bring for the revolution." Guevara, Ernesto. Guerrilla Warfare.
1969, chpt. 4.
91 Al-Muqrin's diplomacy is described as "normally written in blood, decorated with corpses, and perfumed with
gunpowder." Al-Muqrin, 'Abd al-'Aziz and Norman Cigar (trans.). Al-Qa'ida's DoctrineforInsureng: A Practical Coursefor
Guerrilla War. Washington DC: Potomac Books. 2004, p. 127.
92 For human targeting, see Ibid., p. 130-131. On assassination and hostage taking, see Ibid., pp. 141- 164. On urban
operations and tactics, see pp. 165 - 175.
approach that of rural forces. The target set is likewise restricted -as in each examined model of
urban guerrilla warfare- to "soft" targets, e.g. isolated police and state forces, and in the case of
Marighella and al-Muqrin, unarmed civilians. Last, the urban guerrilla is not only predisposed to
terrorist operations because of a limited logistical capacity relative to more organizationally
sophisticated rural units, but due to the availability of clustered human targets and physical assets
ideal for psychologically traumatizing mass causality terrorist attacks. Urban units are thus
optimized for environment, as well as target set.93
Throughout, in contrast to the military-centric rural guerrilla afforded sanctuary, the
urban guerrilla is forced to value security over logistical and operational efficiency -the
maximum advised cell size does not exceed half that of the smallest rural unit,
compartmentalization limiting the efficient transmission of information is required, and
advisable operations are accordingly restricted. The military-centric rural guerrilla thus more
appropriately fits the military classification of guerrilla-insurgent, while the military/civilian-
centric urban guerrilla most closely resembles the guerrilla-terrorist.94
11.4. Battlefield Lessons
Network Structure and Multi-Front Insurgency
With a review of influential guerrilla doctrine complete, we may now consider battlefield lessons
on network structure and multi-front insurgency. In review, the essential material condition of
93 That target-rich urban centers -especially in developing nations- are more prone to terrorist attacks because of the
likelihood of greater economic, psychological, and destructive impact, and the "theatre" afforded by high-visibility cities,
is considered by London School of Economics Professor of Development Studies Jo Beall. Beall, Jo. 'Cities, Terrorism
and Urban Wars of the 21st Century." 9(2). DESTIN. 2007.
94 Although the military classification of guerrilla-terrorist is assigned, it should be emphasized that the primary
determinant of this classification is organizational-that is, small, civilian-centric cells, with minimal connection to the
surrounding population.
operational environment is consistently emphasized as thefundamental determinant of (1)
organizational/network structure, which in turn determines (2) logistical capacity,95 and (3)
feasible tactics. 96 Organizational structure and feasible tactics, subsequently, influence COIN
military classifications of guerrilla or terrorist, with implications for responsive strategy.
The dynamic illustrating organizational evolution and dependent tactical innovation as a
function of environment is therefore clear. What is also apparent is a shift from the urban-rural
dichotomy, previously established by rural-centric Maoist guerrilla doctrine and social theory,97
to multi-front insurgency conducted by organizationally distinct guerrilla units. This shift toward
multi-front insurgency, across both rural and urban operational environments, is in turn
accompanied by an evolution in advised guerrilla organization from Mao's centralized army, to
al-Muqrin's vision of an organizational hybrid between hierarchies and networks fit to front and
campaign. Guerrilla doctrine, as reviewed, hence seems to represent a rich, parallel discussion,
developed and refined in battle over decades, with a captivating emphasis on where guerrillas
fight, and what that means for how they do it.
Discussion
To consider the effects of government and counter-insurgent control more closely, as determined
by the accessibility of contested geophysical and human terrain, the organizational and
operational sophistication of guerrilla organizations may be said to wax and wane with the ebb
and flow of state power imposing security constraints on urban and/or rural guerrilla units. As
9s Specifically, extensive, heavily armed cadre, with relatively open lines of communication, vs. small, lightly armed,
compartmentalized cells.
96 In particular, military vs. civilian-centric.
97 The shift of guerrilla theoreticians from an ideologically-imposed urban-rural dichotomy is a doctrinal phenomenon
following an almost identical pattern to COIN and civil war scholarship moving from rural, to increasingly urban-centric
theories of insurgency. The difference is, however, that this doctrinal shift occurred before Western academics caught
on, and with the best robustness checks available: live-fire military operations.
cities tend to be centers of incumbent power, guerrilla networks are likely to take an evolutionary
trajectory dissimilar to more militarized units operating in the rural periphery. In urban
operational environments, organization is advisably limited to fighting cells employing a
Marighella-model of randomized violence against state power and legitimacy to force
government collapse and withdrawal. This may be a reasonable strategy against a foreign
occupier lacking intelligence, will, and popular support.98 However, an incumbent with many
men, short supply lines, cash, spies, and nowhere to run, may be more capable -and willing- to
crush opponent organization and subversion.
This may in part explain why sustained insurgency in urban centers of incumbent control
is so rare, and why rural insurgency, at the periphery of state control, has been the dominant
mode of guerrilla war in the post-World War II era. What has been the 2 0 th century standard of
rural-centric guerrilla war production may not, however, hold. The global trends of increasing
urbanization and dissolution of intra and inter-state power may contribute to the now (1)
essential strategic and operational salience of target rich, high-visibility cities, today home to a
majority of the world's population; 99 the (2) renewed revolutionary potential of urban proletariat
trapped in mega-city slums across the economic and population engines of the Global South; 00
and (3) an observed decline in politically motivated economies of non-state actor violence.101
98 Examples of successful urban insurgency provided by Hoffman (1998), i.e. the FLN in Algeria, EOKA in Cyprus, and
the Irgun in Palestine, are, for example, all against an over-extended foreign occupier. Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism.
New York: Colombia University Press, 1998, ch. 1,2.
99 To repeat, that target-rich urban centers -especially in developing nations- are more prone to terrorist attacks because
of the likelihood of greater economic, psychological, and destructive impact, and the "theatre" afforded by high-visibility
cities, is considered by London School of Economics Professor of Development Studies Jo Beall. Beall, Jo. "Cities,
Terrorism and Urban Wars of the 21st Century." 9(2). DESTIN. 2007.
100 For statistics on and discussion of megacities and slums, see Zeiderman, Austin. "Cities of the Future? Megacities and
the Space/Time of Urban Modernity." UCLA School of Public Affairs. 2008.
http://www.spa.ucla.edu/critplan/past/volume015/Zeiderman.pdf. For an excellent study of global urban slums,
tomorrow's hotbeds of revolution, disease, and crime, see Davis, Michael. Planet of Slums. Verso. 2006.
101 The incidence of politically motivated non-state actor violence is today declining, and shifting toward ethnic,
sectarian, and resource/rent-motivated warfare. Post-defense discussion with Assistant Professor of Political Science
Fotini Christia at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on September 7, 2011. For
What does the above discussion, considering the effects of current global trends, mean
for the validity and relevance of guerrilla doctrine, both today and tomorrow? The following
pages will attempt a more systematic evaluation of presented lessons on operational
environment, organizational structure, logistical capacity, and dependent tactics. Although it
seems surveyed guerrilla doctrine is representative of rural-centric asymmetric warfare in the
post-World War II era, global trends like (1) increasing urbanization, and (2) dissolution of state
power, must also be considered to maintain model predictive purchase.
work on the new global paradigm of apolitical non-state actor violence, see Rodgers, Dennis. "Slum wars of the 21st
century: gangs, mano dura, and the new urban geography of conflict in Central America." Development and change, 40
(5). 2007, pp. 949-976.
III. Model: Mapping Guerrilla Doctrine
This section will derive a model from the foregoing review of guerrilla doctrine. The derived
model will attempt to further clarify the relationship between terrain, structure, capacity, tactics,
and the military classification of violent non-state actors. Where appropriate, a quantitative
demonstration of model principles will be provided. A complementary model, directly
illustrating the effects of state capacity rather than by proxy through terrain, will also be
proposed largely independent of reviewed doctrine. Last, tentative hypotheses derived from each
model are in turn presented.
111.1. Modeling Front and Organization
Operational Environment and Organization
Working from the premise that rational organizers will attempt to assemble the most logistically
efficient and operationally capable army possible given the material and security constraints of a
given operational environment, this model suggests groups afforded sanctuary, outside
government control, will develop highly centralized, military-centric, guerrilla-insurgent armies.
Once organizationally mature (Phase II-III), armies operating from rural sanctuary are
considered capable of capturing territory, and affecting a three-phase Maoist guerrilla war. This
model of rural guerrilla organization is invariably advised by guerrilla theoreticians fighting in
Asia, the Near East, and Latin America. It is intuitively considered the optimal mode of non-state
actor war production for its ability to (1) capture and control territory, and (2) eventually usurp
incumbent authority, providing security, basic services, and other public goods.
As also expounded across the selection of reviewed guerrilla doctrine, groups operating
in hazardous urban environments that are not afforded sanctuary will be forced to value security
over logistical efficiency and operational capacity. The urban operative will thus lack the rural
guerrilla's wider popular support and military capacity, opting to instead form more secure and
closed, yet operationally limited civilian-centric cells employing descending organizational
models of logistical efficiency as a function of security requirements. These urban guerrilla cells
are, organizationally, closer to terrorist CCN. Model 3.1.1 presents a simplified visual.
Model 3.1.1: Modeling the Relationship Between Operational Environment and Hierarchy
f1\ Y= Level of hierarchy
Predominantly Rural
(Low-government control)
F~g. 11 p=2/3 / p=1/
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Predominantly Urban
(High-government control)
p=5/6
X= Operational Environment
Source: Author
p=1/2
The y-axis maps the level of organizational centralization, or hierarchy, moving from
highly capable, pyramidal rural guerrilla-insurgent structures, to operationally limited,
horizontally organized guerrilla-terrorist cells operating in urban centers. The x-axis maps the
operational environment, or terrain, moving from highly secure cross-border and/or impassibly
treacherous rural sanctuaries, to increasingly urban, government-controlled operational
environments. The apparent third dimension does not measure a third variable. It is only used to
demonstrate the breadth of feasible cell structures suitable for urban operations. Cells move from
hierarchical, pyramidal cells (forefront left, fig. 1.1), to a series of modified structures,
decreasing in inter-cell communicational connectivity (density p), as a function of increasing
government control (proxied by operational environment/terrain, x-axis).
As organizationally mature groups move from predominantly rural sanctuaries to
increasingly urban centers of government control, there is thus an observed decline in hierarchy
and group membership. As such model 3.1.1 presents a series of cell structures representing
various levels of intra-cell hierarchy and compartmentalization as dictated by security
requirements. Each cell corner represents a cell member, or "node" (N) -not to exceed four, as
advised by al-Muqrin and Guevara (2 < N < 4) . Each horizontal line connecting cell nodes
represents a compartmental communicational "link," e.g. between cell command, intelligence,
logistics, and/or assault elements. Cell "density" (p) may be formally modeled as the actual
number of links between nodes (L), over the maximum number of links connecting nodes: 102
(p) = L/N (N-1)/2
102 The hypergeometric distribution indicates that N items taken two at a time without regard to order can be
accomplished in N!/[(N - 2)!2/g = N(N -1)/2 ways. Enders, Walters, and Xuejuan Su. "Rational Terrorists and Optimal
Network Structure." Journal of Conflict Resolution 51(1). 2007, p. 56.
Toward the low end of the security spectrum, forces are organized hierarchically, in a
"pyramid force structure" (forefront right, fig. 1.1).103 This cell structure, (p) = 6/4(4-1)72 = 1,
maintains a maximum communicational density, and hence logistical capacity.104 Although
hierarchy and unfettered cell-compartment communication may permit greater unit cohesion and
logistical efficiency, security concerns, i.e. infiltration, necessarily limits member knowledge of
comrade identities and unit occupations as cells moved into more secure urban zones. 10 5 As such,
the remainder of feasible four-node cells in model 3.1.1 proceed in a series of modified star
structures, of decreasing L and dependent p (5/6 & 2/3), until reaching a minimally linked chain
structure (p = %), organized horizontally, "like a set of worry beads." 06
In order to demonstrate that cell security is a function of density p, the following exercise,
proposed by Enders and Su (2007), is useful. Suppose the counter-terrorist infiltrates any node,
with the probability of successful node compromise given by pl. If the network structure is
unknown to the counter-terrorist, each node has an equal probability of being compromised.
103 'Abd al-'Aziz and Norman Cigar (trans.). Al-Qa'ida's Doctrine for Insurgeng: A Practical Course for Guerrlla War.
Washington DC: Potomac Books. 2004, pp. 120 - 121.
104 This phenomenon, that of communicational density affecting logistical efficiency and operational capacity of illicit
networks, has been examined previously in terrorism studies (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones 2008). Evaluating the
danger posed by decentralized illicit networks, Sangiovanni and Jones demonstrate why a minimal communicational
density, although improving cell security, actually inhibits capacity. Citing business management literature evaluating the
efficiency of tele-meetings and numerous anecdotal accounts of illicit network organization, the authors discover that
decentralized networking is so inefficient, causing confusion, misunderstanding, and incoordination, that, for example, in
the case of the 9/11 conspirators, cell members had to abandon strictly imposed compartmentalization to meet face to
face in Las Vegas, in a setting maximizing network density and hierarchy before hashing out final attack details. It is at
this point -the necessary, if brief, organizational re-shuffling of otherwise hermetic cells- that networks are most
vulnerable to infiltration and decapitation. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette and Calvert Jones. "Assessing the Dangers of
Illicit Networks: Why al-Qa'ida May be Less Threatening Than Many Think." International Security. Fall 2008.
105 As al-Muqrin tells: "There is an error that mostjihadi have fallen into, namely that an individual in the organization
knows everything about the organization, including its secret affairs. Or, one finds that one of the operational groups
know everything from A to Z about a specific activity or a specific operation, since it collects intelligence, plans,
executes, and commands." 'Abd al-'Aziz and Norman Cigar (trans.). Al-Qaida's Doctrinefor Insurgency: A Practical Coursefor
Guerilla War. Washington DC: Potomac Books. 2004, pp. 120 - 121.
106 'Abd al-'Aziz and Norman Cigar (trans.). Al-Qa'ida's Doctrine for Insurgency: A Practical Course for Guerrilla War.
Washington DC: Potomac Books. 2004, p. 121.
Thus if there are N cell members, the probability that any node is compromised is 1/N. Given N
and L, the expected number of compromised nodes (C) is: 107
C = pi (1 + 2L/N)
Given L links among N people, the average person is connected to L/(N/2) = 2L/N. Thus,
the infiltration of any single node compromises 1 + 2L/N cell members with probability pl. To
express C as a function of density p, the equation may be rewritten as:
C = p1 [1+(N-1) p]
In figure 1.1, p = 1, and N- 1 = 3. Therefore, in the case of the most hierarchically
organized, logistically efficient model of cell organization, the infiltration of any node is
expected to compromise four people - or the entire cell - with probability pl. In contrast,
maximum-security, low-efficiency chain-structure cells, with p = %, would only be expected to
compromise 2.5 cell members with probability p, should any node be infiltrated (2.5 =1 + 3 x
0.5).108 Al-Muqrin and Guevara's suggestions limiting cell members -minimizing N- and
advising compartmentalization - minimizing L- thus appear well founded.
111.2. Additional Dependent Variables
Logistical Capacity, Dependent Tactics, and Military Classification
Having covered the relationship between operational environment (rural vs. urban), and
organizational structure (pyramidal vs. modified cell), we may consider additional dependent
variables. Given the forgoing discussion, it would thus seem that only those cells adopting a
107 For formula proof, see Enders, Walters, and Xuejuan Su. "Rational Terrorists and Optimal Network Structure."
Journal of Conflict Resolution 51(1). 2007, p. 56.
108 Ibid., p. 46-47.
high-security, low-efficiency structure, as determined by cell density p, are likely to survive in
urban environments under a high-degree of government control.
It thus follows that high-security, logistically inefficient urban units, unable to effectively
organize a numerous, well equipped force, will be more inclined to strike "soft" targets, e.g.
unarmed civilians and isolated state-forces, and to compensate for numerical inferiority with
operations inflicting maximum psychological impact at minimal cost, e.g. spectacular explosive
attacks. As security is valued over logistical efficiency, hermetic urban cells will additionally
lack strong popular support -an essential requirement for any successful insurgent organization.
When combined with an organizational predilection selecting soft targets for spectacular attack,
weak popular representation, reinforced through isolation, thus makes the urban guerrilla more
representative of parasitic CCN than a mass insurgent movement.
The above presented model of rural and urban non-state actor organization predicts that
(1) the independent variable of operational environment (rural vs. urban) will dictate the (2)
dependent variable of organizational structure (army vs. cell). A change in organizational
structure will subsequently affect the (3) logistical capacity (efficient vs. inefficient), and (4)
corresponding tactics (phased guerrilla war vs. terrorism) and target set (military-centric vs.
civilian-centric). Tactics and target set in turn determine (5) military classification (guerrilla-
insurgent vs. guerrilla-terrorist).
Model 3.1.1 illustrates the effects of operational environment, determined largely by
terrain. What results is an organizational hybrid between hierarchical rural units and
decentralized urban networks operating side-by-side in a multi-front mode of insurgency. The
following subsection will also consider operational environment, but with a direct focus on state
capacity rather than the proxy of terrain. As guerrilla war is today shifting to multi-front
insurgency in the wake of increasing urbanization and declining state power, a model
considering state capacity directly may more accurately draw 2 1st century asymmetric conflict.
111.3. Complementary Model
Terrain or Government Control?
Guerrilla theoreticians discuss the independent variable of operational environment at length,
with a particular emphasis on the security hazards of urban operations limiting cell size and
dependent logistical capacity (Mao 1937; Guevara 1969; al-Muqrin ca. 2004 et al.). For al-
Muqrin, government-controlled cities are "full of eyes" - spies, police and soldiers. 10 9 Guevara
warns the would-be urban guerrilla of enemy "vigilance," and the "much greater" risk of
betrayal. 10 The message is clear: Operational environment, largely defined by terrain, matters
only because it may reasonably proxy for government control and strength.
The term "operational environment" has therefore been considered synonymous with
government control. But is it always true that terrain may reasonably proxy for government
control,' 11 especially in today's increasingly urban world?1 2 Terrain may positively correlate
with degree of government control in a rural-centric society and past. Yet may not incumbent
power flag -even collapse- in urban centers, as Baghdad, Karachi, and Rio de Janeiro, have
similarly burned?
109 Al-Muqrin, 'Abd al-'Aziz and Norman Cigar (trans.). Al-Qa'ida's Doctrinefor Insurgency: A Practical Coursefor Guerrilla
War. Washington DC: Potomac Books. 2004, p. 120.
10 "The vigilance of the enemy will be much greater, and the possibilities of reprisals as well as of betrayal are increased
enormously." Guevara, Ernesto. Guerrilla Varfare. 1969, chpt. 6.
"I Government control may be approximated by variables including density of police and troops to inhabitants, level of
infrastructure development and economic activity, and proximity to the capital, for example. Rough terrain may lack all.
Intra-conflict micro-level data is needed to determine exactly to what extent.
112 For the first time in human history, more people live in urban rather than rural centers, with 70% of the world's
population projected to live in cities by 2040. This is a monumental change, with implications for police work and
COIN. For statistics on global urbanization, see "Human Population: Urbanization." Population Reference Bureau.
2007. http://www.prb.org/Educators/TeachersGuides/HumanPopulation/Urbanization.aspx.
This thesis accordingly proposes a second model (model 3.3.1) complementing model
3.1.1. It should be emphasized, however, that unlike model 3.1.1, model 3.3.1 is only indirectly
tied to reviewed guerrilla doctrine. Surveyed doctrine only suggests organization is a function of
government control. As noted throughout the foregoing review of influential fighting manuals,
the only explicitly stated determinant of guerrilla organization is operational environment,
classified according to terrain. The following model is therefore based on impressions and
insights garnered from reviewed doctrine only. To this end, model 3.3.1 maps the effects of
government control -irrespective of terrain- on organizational structure and dependent logistical
capacity. Model 3.3.1 may reflect a modern world of mass, urban slums, far from incumbent
centers of power, more accurately than model 3.1.1.
Model 3.3.1: Modeling the Relationship between government control and hierarchy
p=1/3
p=2/3
High government control
(Small guerilla cells [-2])
Average government control
(Mid-sized, local militia [-2])
nw government control
(Large, mobile guerilla army [-3D
Source: Author
The above model illustrates the relationship between government control and
organizational structure. Moving upwards, the pyramidal and cell-based structures represent
decreasing levels of hierarchy and membership, as a function of increasing government control.
In model 3.3.1, two intersecting planes represent government control. An insurgency is thus
much like an iceberg: A tip of local guerrilla cells, of decreasing inter-cell communicational
connectivity (density p), as a function of increasing government control, is but all that is initially
visible. As the sea of government control evaporates, larger, more capable units, are increasingly
apparent. 113
The large pyramidal base (center bottom) corresponds to mobile, centralized, well
equipped (-3) guerrilla organizations. These groups have many fighters and an extensive base of
popular support -an organizational and logistical feat only possible at the model base of low
government control. 1 4 The smaller pyramidal structure above the first plane of average
government control (center) represents the variety of (-2) local militias that proliferate as states
fail." 5 Finally, above the second plane of high government control, horizontally organized (-2)
guerrilla cells, of varying p values and corresponding logistical efficiency, emerge. 1 6 When
combined with a limited capacity for the incumbent -political or otherwise- to impose violence,
an urban base of social mobilization may thus affect a successful guerrilla war.'17 Urban fighters
may then attack all facets of state power, rather than necessarily soft targets.
111.4. Global Trends, Model Hypotheses, Discussion
Model 3.3.1 applies not only to rural peripheries, largely free from government control, but
urban centers under decreasing government control -especially in the developing Global South,
113 Molnar, Andrew. "Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies." Department of the Army (1966)
http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/docrepository/dapam550_104insurgencies.pdf.
114 This appears to accurately reflect urban insurgencies in for example lawless Fallujah during the Third Gulf War.
115 The work of Lindsey and Petersen (2011) is here relevant: "Some individuals will adopt a role of direct and organized
participation in a locally based, armed organization. In the absence of a weak state, individuals in this role often take the
form of local militia members." Sunni and Shi'a defensive militias organized in Baghdad and al-Anbar province during
the Third Gulf War are examples. Lindsey, John, and Roger Petersen. "Varieties of Counterinsurgency: A Case Study of
Iraq." Newport: Naval War College, 2011.
116 Again, from Lindsey and Petersen (2011): "In the presence of a powerful state, such individuals may seem uninvolved
citizens by day, while fighting at night. Even the most powerful states can have trouble identifying and neutralizing
actors in this role." Ibid.
117 As previously noted by Staniland (2010). Staniland, Paul. "Cities on Fire." Journal of Comparative Politics. 2010.
home to weak states, and target-rich, exploding urban populations. Model 3.3.1 thus makes four
hypotheses we may evaluate against a case study insurrection:
1. Guerrilla organizational hierarchy and corresponding logistical capacity will increase as
government control fades in either rural peripheries or urban centers. Failed-state urban
centers are thus as likely to see sophisticated organized violence on the scale of rural armies.
2. As a function of organizational structure, urban cells will likely use terrorist tactics at
campaign onset. They may however graduate to more organizationally and operationally
sophisticated military-centric guerrilla organizations as the state begins to fail.
3. Model 3.3.1 seems most applicable to the highly urbanized, largely weak-state Global South.
There, terrain may not necessarily correlate with government control as marginalized urban
slums expand beyond the reach of government security and services.
4. Should the global trends of increasing urbanization and dissolution of state power continue,
the next wave of highly organized and logistically capable insurgency and social violence
may expectedly occur in urban centers rather than the rural periphery.
Model 3.3.1 is useful; it more directly illustrates the effects of state capacity on guerrilla network
structure, and is more readily applicable to examples of asymmetric conflict in a more urbanized
world. It also challenges the relevance of guerrilla doctrine, mostly written in a more rural-
centric past. However, model 3.1.1 is still valuable. From it we may derive the following four
hypotheses:
1. Model 3.1.1, and hence most influential guerrilla doctrine, is still applicable to insurgency
today. A prevailing condition of politically motivated urban insurgency has yet to arrive.
2. Model 3.1.1 will accurately reflect less urbanized states, like Afghanistan and Yemen, 1 8
economically and demographically similar to those of rural-centric theoreticians.
3. Model 3.1.1 will accurately reflect guerrilla organization in states in which terrain may still
reasonably proxy for government control, like the better policed cities of the Global North.119
4. Model 3.1.1 thus seems to apply to states at opposite ends of the developmental spectrum.
For weak, poor urban states, model 3.3.1 seems to apply.
Model 3.1.1 applies to the past and immediate present, as well as rural-centric and developed
states. Model 3.3.1 applies to the immediate present, an urbanized future, and urban-centric
developing states. Both are thus complementary. Each may be applied to different societies as
prevailing socioeconomic conditions indicate. Lessons on expected centers of organization,
network structure, tactics, and feasible target set, attend. The fig. 3.4.1 presents a concise review.
Fig. 3.4.1: Review of Cases Applicable to Model 3. 1.1 and 3.3.1
Mod 3.1.1 Mod 3.3.1 Mod 3.1.1
Source: Author
118 As of 2010, the populations of Afghanistan and Yemen are 20 and 32% urbanized, respectively. "Urbanization." The
Central Intelligence Agency World Fact Book. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2212.html
119 There, cities are relatively well policed and serviced, and the phenomenon of rural periphery to urban center
migration is largely complete.
Discussion
Al-Muqrin's vision of multi-front insurgency, occurring intra and inter-nationally as urbanization
increases and state power wanes, seems more probable. Multi-front insurgency, or the
simultaneous pursuit of urban and rural campaigns, was once only theoretically feasible -rarely
have guerrilla groups graduated from the rural-urban dichotomy to pursue multi-front
insurgency. Today, more sophisticated urban guerrilla operations and organization in less
policed, bloated cities -occurring alongside rural drives- is increasingly a reality.
A hypothesized divide between the Global North and South is also clear. If trends of state
power dissolution and increasing urbanization are expected to affect guerrilla organization and
mobilization, it seems the Global South may experience a wave of violent non-state actor
mobilization moving past cell-based structures, to well organized and logistically sophisticated
urban units wreaking systemic havoc -even usurping state authority in particularly marginalized
areas.121 The better policed, serviced, and population-stable Global North,122 in contrast, is
unlikely to see more than logistically limited model 3.1.1 urban cells employing civilian-centric
120 Only 5% of militant organizations last more than a decade. Although the cited study refers to mostly "terrorist"
organizations, many are confounded guerrilla organizations (e.g. Hezbollah and the Tamil Tigers), while most others are
structurally similar to an incipient insurgency. Byman, Daniel. "Meeting the Threat of Terrorism after 9/11." Brookings.
2003. http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2003/0331terrorism-byman.aspx.
121 The gang-ruled slums of Rio de Jainero, Brazil, and the bloody, narco-terrorist battlefields of Ciudad Juirez, Mexico,
are salient examples. However, it must be stated -and emphatically so- that the mass urban violence in both states is
almost in its entirety apolitical, and thus dissimilar from politically motivated guerrilla organizations and insurgent
movements examined in this thesis. This is, indeed, another 21st century trend, at least in Latin America: the advent, or
"shift" in the political economy of violence, from political, to material/rent motivated subversive organization and
attacks. Although an essential phenomenon worth observing and incorporating into future work, it is beyond the scope
of this thesis, limited to politically motivated, guerrilla organizations. For a taxonomy of Mexican drug cartels, see Cook,
W. Colleen. "Mexico's Drug Cartels." The Congressional Research Service. 2007.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34215.pdf. For a comparison of Mexico's drug cartels to a logistically sophisticated
insurgency, see "Clinton says Mexico drug crime like an insurgency." BBC 2010. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
us-canada-11234058.
122The Global North's demographic stability -or, more accurately, shrinkage approaching crisis- is well documented.
For a summary paper, see "The EU's Demographic Crisis." Network of European Union Centers of Excellence (EUCE) at the
Universit ofNorth Carolina, Chapel Hill. 2008. http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/businessmedia/mediabriefs/Brief9-
0803-demographic-crisis.pdf.
terrorist tactics. 123 The proceeding section will evaluate model 3.1.1 and corresponding
hypotheses against a qualitative insurgency case study, with suggestions on future work
evaluating the external validity of model 3.3.1. We may thereby assess the strategic and
operational value of influential guerrilla doctrine considering operational environment,
organizational structure, logistical capacity, and dependent tactics, as presented and modeled.
123 The most immediate examples are the Madrid 2004 and London 2005 terrorist attacks. Although the implicated
parties were largely middle-class, operationally inexperienced "gangs," more akin to hermetic terrorist cells than
logistically sophisticated guerrilla organizations, the men were tied to larger guerrilla organizations in North Africa, like
the Moroccan Combatant Group, or GICM. On the amateurish logistics of the London attacks, see Silber, Mitchell D.
"Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat." NVYPD, 2006, p. 24. On organizational ties with more
sophisticated guerrilla groups, see "In the Spotlight: Moroccan Combatant Group (GICM) ." Centerfor Defense Information.
2004.
IV. Case Study: Peru's Sendero Luminoso
This section will present a qualitative case-study of Sendero Luminoso (SL). The independent
variable of operational environment will be operationalized through ACD on dyadic conflict,
providing in-country empirics on conflict location, onset, duration, and termination (Cederman,
Min, Wimmer 2010). Additional resources, including topographical and satellite imagery, will be
used to approximate government control through a rough terrain proxy.
The dependent variables of organizational structure, logistical capacity, tactics, and
military classification, will be operationalized through a limited review of declassified Peruvian
intelligence reports, SL's captured central archives, and secondary-source literature identifying
force structure and modes of attack during Phase I initial organization (ca. 1980), and Phase 1I -
III rural and urban guerrilla operations (ca. 1982 - 1992). Windows of initial and peak SL
organizational and operational sophistication are selected in order to demonstrate (1) the location
of initial guerrilla organization, advised throughout reviewed doctrine to occur in rural sanctuary;
and (2) the maximum extent of guerrilla organizational sophistication, reflecting only the
material constraints of asymmetric battle, rather than deductive doctrine more usefulfor initial
organization than sustained combat. This way, we may evaluate whether guerrilla doctrine
accurately reflects the conditions of asymmetric warfare, or if it is best discarded once bullets,
rather than words, begin to fly.
Notably, phased SL organizational evolution occurred as Peru shifted from a rural-
centric, agrarian society, to an increasingly industrialized, urban centric economy and
population. In this way, we may (1) evaluate the strategic and operational value of both rural and
urban-centric guerrilla doctrine; (2) determine to what extent doctrine matters with protracted
combat; and (3) the potential effects of global trends like increasing urbanization and dissolution
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of state power, more broadly defined under the independent variable of operational environment,
which may affect how guerrillas organize and fight.
IV.1. Origins: Doctrine, Organization, and Phased Guerrilla War
Onigins
SL began as the "Fraccidn Roja (FR), " or "Red Faction," established in 1964 as the military
wing of the Communist Party of Peru (CPP). 124 In 1970, at the direction of Abimael Guzmin,
CPP officer and professor of philosophy at the San Crist6bal of Huamanga National University,
FR would be rechristened as SL. The CPP SL splinter organization would subsequently begin an
ideological shift from urban-centric Marxism-Leninism, to rural-centric Maoism.125
Through an intensive program of psychological intimidation and force of character, 126
Guzmin would from this point consolidate his near complete control over the well defined SL
hierarchy -an extensive apparatus he would come to call his "killing machine." 127 By 1980,
having relocated from San Crist6bal of Huamanga National University to the mountainous
southern highlands surrounding the city of Ayacucho,12 8 SL would initiate a series of party
conferences prior to insurgency onset. Party conferences would culminate with the Central
Committee's Second Plenary on March 17, 1980, and the establishment of the SL Military
124 Inca, Ger6nimo. E/ABC de Sendero Luminosoy delMRTA. Lima: Grupo Editorial Ger6nimo Inca SA (GEGISA).
1994, pp. 21-22.
125 W ei n, Jeremy M. Inside Rebel/ion: The Po/itics ofInsurgent Violence. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007, p.
86, 117.
126 Party leaders and upper-echelon recruits were subjected to grueling "self-criticism" sessions at the direction of
Guzmin -naturally the sole party member excluded from the process. In this way, Guzmin established a Stalinist-Maoist
cult of personality in his mountain strongholds. Gorriti, Gustavo and Robin Kirk (trans.). The Shining Path: A Histoy of the
Millenarian War in Peru. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Chapel Hill Press. 1999, pp. 29-36.
127 Ibid., p. xi.
128 As regionally coded by ACD. "UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, Version 4-2009." 2009. Uppsala
Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.
School on April 2, 1980. 129 On May 17, 1980, the SL insurgency was launched when five hooded
men assaulted and burned the voter registration office in the rural town of Chuschi near
Ayacucho. 130 By 1981, SL claimed to have over 500 armed rebels. 3 1
Doctrine, Organization and Phased Guemilla War
Three items deserve emphasis: (1) SL 's fundamental, comprehensive implementation of guerrilla
doctrine; (2) initially centralized, logistically capable organizational structure; and (3) phased
model of guerrilla war. First, from the beginning of SL organization, theory eclipsed praxis. The
decision to move SL 's core network deeper into Peru's mountainous rural periphery was as much
based on the perceived merits of Maoist rural-centric guerrilla doctrine as the more material, near
irresistible opportunity to strike at state power in urban Lima. Guzmin thus began the decisive
Second Plenary not with a discussion on conventional military strategy, but with a literary and
methodological reflection linking "[Maoist] theoretical knowledge to revolutionary practice." 132
Following an intensive plenary study of Mao (1934),13 Irving (1850),134 and Shakespeare (ca.
1605),135 Professor Guzmin would, deductively, declare the strategic primacy of Maoist rural-
centric revolt, 136 with "conditions ripe for violent upheaval in the countryside."1 3 7
129 The SL Military School, however, bore little resemblance to a traditional military training camp. Although SL did not
neglect standard infantry courses, including raid, ambush, sabotage, and weapons training, direct action was consistently
subordinated to political indoctrination. Ibid.
130 Weinstein, Jeremy M. Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007, p.
17.
131 Ibid., p. 117. The 500 member figure Weinstein cites comes from captured SL document "Desplegar la Guerra de
Guerrillas," May 1981, DINCOTE Sendero collection, Lima, Peru.
132 Gorriti, Gustavo and Robin Kirk (trans.). The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru. Chapel Hill and
London: University of North Carolina Chapel Hill Press. 1999, pp. 23-24.
133 Tse Tung, Mao. "Three Short Poems." 1934.
134 Irving, Washington. The Life ofMohamet. Berhn Tauchnitz Jun. 1850.
135 Shakespeare, William. Macbeth. Ca. 1605.
136 The CPP had long venerated Mao, with a singular focus approaching deification. Guzmin only built upon and
extended this ideological tradition. For reams of CPP propaganda venerating and eulogizing Mao following his death in
1976, see Bandera Roja, "iGlora eterna al Presidente Mao Tsetunggran maestro delproletariado internacional, de los pueblos oprimidosj
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When criticized by party cadre for emphasizing rural mobilization at the expense of city
operations, Guzmin, citing Mao, Lenin, and Ho Chi Minh, silenced his critics with the
observation that "a particularity of the popular war in Peru is to make the countryside the
principal theatre of actions and the cities a necessary complement," and any confusion as to the
revolutionary potential of Peru's urban proletariat was due to "bourgeois propaganda," focusing
disproportionate media attention to city attacks, rather than sound "Marxist analysis." 138 With the
decision to fight from the hills thus decided according to primarily doctrinal considerations, SL
released its last public document prior to initiating hostilities. Titled "The Celebration of May
First by the Revolutionary Proletariat," this last party pamphlet, issued on May 1, 1980, outlined
SL grand strategy, and emphasized the essential role of rural-centric doctrine:
"Marxist-Leninist-Mao Tse Tung thought is the ideology of the international proletariat
and the general political line of the revolution is its application to our concrete reality...in all its
glory the task of the coming revolution ... is to BEGIN ARMED STRUGGLE [emphasis in the
original]. To begin the hard and prolonged Agrarian War that follows the path of surrounding the
cities from the countryside, creating revolutionary bases of support [sic]." 139
According to captured internal directives, SL rural-centric ideology -ascendant even
military training- 1 would thus establish three essential concepts and corresponding tasks: (1)
The "Popular War," or the "Unitary Popular War," where the countryside is the principal theatre
of operations, and the city its complement; (2) the construction of "Revolutionary Armed
de la revolucidn mundial!" 1976. Sendero Luminoso collection of pamphlets, serials, fliers, and party congresses from 1962
to 1985 (reel 1).
137 Gorriti, Gustavo and Robin Kirk (trans.). The Shining Path: A Histoy of the Millenarian War in Peru. Chapel Hill and
London: University of North Carolina Chapel Hill Press. 1999, p. 27.
138 Ibid., p.67. For the original captured document, see "Bases de Discusi6n," E/ Diario, January 6, 1988, p.7 .
139 Ibid., p. 56.
140 For an excellent discussion on SL subordination of tactics to ideology, see Gorriti, Gustavo and Robin Kirk (trans.).
The Shining Path: A Histoy of the Millenarian War in Peru. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Chapel
Hill Press. 1999, pp. 29-33.
Forces," or the "Popular Guerrilla Army," called the "Popular Liberation Army," and (3) strategy
and tactics, defined as the art of directing military operations, and studying the laws that
influence war in general, and military operations in particular.141
Second, the Second Plenary fundamentally affected SL organization, and consolidated
Guzmin's position as the anointed leader of the SL millenarian insurgency. It was during this
meeting, on the eve of battle with Leviathan, that Guzmin formally advanced SL 's strategy for
guerrilla war with an urgency and intensity apropos the irrevocable decision to contest state
power by force of arms. The firm agenda and path to victory delineated throughout the Second
Plenary are evidence of Guzmin's centralized control over the hierarchically organized SL
guerrilla network, himself to head every major committee in the organization, including the
Central, Political, Permanent, Presidential, and Military Commissions.142
Announcing at the Second Plenary that SL was logistically "able to take on the Beginning
of the Armed Struggle (BAS)," party chiefs were to determine "how the masses [would] be
incorporated, mobilized, politicized, organized, and provided with weapons." 43 Having
identified the initial extent of SL centralization and corresponding logistical capacity, we arrive
at a third point: SL 's phased model of Maoist guerrilla warfare. Identifying when SL shifted from
Phase I to Phase 11-111 operations is important; doing so will lend perspective as to the extent and
sophistication of SL organization and operations at a time of strategic parity with state forces.
We may thus observe the longitudinal effects of the independent variable of operational
141 Inca, Ger6nimo. ElABC de Sendero Luminosoy delMRTA. Lima: Grupo Editorial Ger6nimo Inca SA (GEGISA).
1994, p. 32.
142 Ibid., pp. 82-83. As for the Second Plenary, it was dedicated to the discussion of the (1) actual situation of the party
and its union to mass struggle; (2) development by actions of the militarization of the party; (3) readjustment of the party
to focus on military matters; (4) action plan for the BAS (Beginning of the Armed Struggle); (5) rectification campaign;
and (6) agreements. The Shining Path: A Histog of the Millenanan War in Peru. Chapel Hill and London: University of North
Carolina Chapel Hill Press. 1999, p. 23.
143 Ibid., p. 24.
environment, defined by a given conflict's physical, human, and institutional terrain, and
identifiable systemic trends like increasing urbanization.
A series of captured SL directives and declassified military and civilian intelligence
reports delineate the structured shift from Phase I to Phase II-III guerrilla operations. First, SL
documents deductively establish four principal characteristics of the Peruvian asymmetric
battlefield, from which the strategic outline for staged revolt would be derived. They are:
1. Peru is a semi-feudal state and semi-colonial, ruled by "Bureaucratic Capitalism." This
oppressive system crushes 50% of the masses, so there is reason for revolt.
2. The enemy is tactically strong but strategically weak.
3. The Popular Guerrilla Army is tactically weak but strategically strong.
4. The CPP pursues a just war.144
From points one through three, SL moves to argue that the Popular Guerrilla Army
"... cannot grow quickly nor soon defeat the Peruvian armed forces and national police. These
are the peculiarities that determine the prolonged character of the Peruvian revolution," which is
to unfold in "three stages." SL's phased model of warfare, bearing a striking similarity to
reviewed Maoist doctrine, proceeds as:
1. The phase of the "Strategic Offensive" of the "Ordered [i.e. State] Forces" and the "Strategic
Defensive of SL." This war is specified as "Guerrilla War."
144 Inca, Ger6nimo. EABC de Sendero Luminosoy de/MRTA. Lima: Grupo Editorial Ger6nimo Inca SA (GEGISA).
1994, p. 35.
2. The phase of strategic consolidation and preparation for the SL counter-offensive, which will
result in "Strategic Parity." This war is specified as "The War of Movement."
3. The stage of the "Strategic Offensive of SL," and the "Strategic Retreat" of state forces. This
war is specified as "The War of Positions."1 4 5
The specific timeline for SL's staged campaign is documented by a National Intelligence
Service (NIS) report delivered in 1984 to President Fernando Belaninde Terry and his Chief of
Staff. Described as "waves" rather than phases, the SL insurgency was cited to have initiated the
phases of Guerrilla Warfare (I), Strategic Parity (II), and Strategic Offensive (III) on March 17,
1980, October 20, 1982, and March 15, 1984, respectively. 14 6 We may thus identify SL Phase 11-
III to have began between 1982 - 1984, with Phase I to have occurred from 1980, immediately
following the Second Plenary, to 1982, immediately prior to Phase 11-III. With this introduction
emphasizing the strategic primacy of rural-centric guerrilla doctrine vis-i-vis SL 's selected base
of operations, Guzmin's centralized control over his hierarchically organized killing machine,
and SL 's phased model of Maoist guerrilla warfare, we may examine SL operational
environment, dependent organization, and tactics.
145 Two important dynamics are apparent, namely (1) the fundamental influence of Maoist guerrilla doctrine, and (2) the
evolution in organizational sophistication from guerrilla bands to more sophisticated conventional military units as state
power fails. Ibid., p. 36.
146 Nota de Informacion No. 001-DGIFI. Servicio de Intehgencia Nacional. July 18, 1984. 2nd collections of ephemera from the
Peruvian insurrection (reel 1).
IV.2. Independent Variable: Phase 1-111 Operational Environments
Phase I-III Operational Environment: Peru's Physical, Human, and Institutional Terrain
According to ACD and relevant secondary-source literature, 147 the SL rebellion is approximated
to have initiated north of the Ayacucho Highlands, in a river valley at decimal degrees latitude -
12 and longitude -74 (fig. 4.2.1-2). The nearest road, highway 28C, terminates 40 km away.
Ringed by the -3,000 m Peruvian Andes, the valley altitude of 420 m, twice that of Lima,
rapidly climbs to -2,000 m when entering Otishi National Park 50 km away. The valley is -350
km from Lima, a city of ~8,000,000 inhabitants.14' ACD location coding remains constant
throughout conflict duration (1965 - 1999).149
Fig. 4.2.1: Initial Base of SL Mobilization: Ayacucho River Valley Rural Settlements
147 The ACD supplement listing approximate coordinates of conflict location puts initial SL activity at decimal degrees
latitude -12, and longitude -74.
148 Source of imagery, distances, and elevation Google Earth. On Lima's population, see "Peru." CIA World Fact Book.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pe.html.
149 The cited conflict duration includes "minor" (25 -999 battlefield deaths) and "civil war" (at least 1,000 battlefield
deaths). Accordingly this study thus cites 1980 as the beginning of civil war.
Fig. 4.2.2: Detail of Ayacucho River Valley Rural Settlements
With ACD and satellite imagery approximating the initial base of SL mobilization, the
following sub-section will review captured SL documents and directives, and Peruvian
intelligence and military reports, to more precisely identify SL modes of Phase I-III organization
and attack. Primary-source reports will then be evaluated against topography and population
maps generated through ArcGIS spatial analysis software. In this way, we may observe the*
effects of the independent variable of operational environment, defined by terrain, population,
and government, on the dependent variables of guerrilla organization and logistical capacity,
operationalized through the above noted review of declassified intelligence and military reports.
Regarding SL Phase I-III operational environment, period military and civilian
intelligence confirm SL was initially based in Peru's treacherous Ayacucho highlands. On
December 6, 1978, report 17-DPE from the Civil Guard's Central Intelligence Office "described
how SL had divided Ayacucho city zones," with preparations to "initiate armed struggle in the
rural sector, for which it should be establishing support bases in the Apurimac River jungle.""'
An air force intelligence report written on February 22, 1980 a the outset of Phase I
attacks noted "the Communist Party Peru [sic] Shining Path is preparing a guerrilla war
conceived within the Maoist idea of war from the countryside to the city and war from the urban
periphery (young towns) to the urban center (residential areas).""' The same report would
"precisely record" the areas that would be the "primary and secondary theaters of war three years
later" during Phase II operations, namely the Upper Huallaga Cayamarca, Ayacucho, and
Huancavelica regions.15 2 Fig. 4.2.3 maps the above reports' cited locations of Phase I-II SL
operations against ArcGIS satellite topography data.
150 Intelligence Report 17-DPE from the Civil Guard Central Intelligence, December 6,1978. Reported in The Shining
Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Chapel Hill Press.
1999, p. 47.
151 DINSE-FAP Report 339-FL, February 22, 1980. Reported in Ibid., p. 52.
152 Ibid.
Fig. 4.2.3: ArcGIS: Mapping Report 17-DPE on Phase I-III Zones
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Value
In fig. 4.2.3, each provincial center of primary SL Phase I-II base of operations is outlined,
proceeding, North to South, from the Upper Huallaga Cayamarca, Lima, Huancavelica, and
Ayacucho areas. As apparent, SL organization was initially confined to only the most
inaccessible terrain, far from coastal Lima. By the mid- 1980's Phase 11-111 SL regional
committees had spread to most of Peru, including the Principal Committee (Ayacucho,
Huancavelica, and Apurimac); Regional Committee (Cerro de Pasco, Huinuco, and Huancayo);
and the Northern and Southern Committees (Piura, Huallaga, Cajamarca, and Cuzco et al.). 5 3
One of the largest SL regional committees, the Comiti Regional de Alto Huallaga (CRH),
centered its operations in the coca-growing jungles of the Upper Huallaga." 4
By 1988, SL began intensive urban attacks alongside rural operations, with the middle-
class Lima district of Miraflores one of the hardest hit."5 Interestingly, at this stage of SL
organization, urban operations began to supersede rural subversion -so much so that Guzmin
decided to shift his central network to Lima. An intensive urban bombing campaign followed. 156
Himself a victim to the operational hazards of the better surveilled and policed urban guerrilla
theatre, 57 year-old Guzmin was finally apprehended during a Counter-Terrorism Directorate
(DIRCOTE) raid on an SL safe-house in the middle-class Lima neighborhood of Surco on
September 12, 1992.157 Figs. 4.2.4-5 give period satellite imagery (1990) of urban Lima, site of
the 1992 decapitation of SL, and rural Cuzco, site of one of the largest SL massacres.1 58
153 Weinstein, Jeremy M. Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007, pp.
150-151.
154 Ibid., pp. 151-155. Imagery provided by Google Earth.
155 Ibid., p. 87. Imagery provided by Google Earth.
156 The operation was so secretive, not even President Fujimori was notified. "Guerrilla Chief's Arrest Shifts Tide of
Conflict and Evokes Relief." The Sendero Files. Issue No. 4. October 1992. http://www.gci275.com/peru/sf4.shtml
157 Ibid.
158 Salazar, Milagros. "Perd: Deudos de Mayor Masacre de Sendero en Pos de Justicia." 2010.
http://ipsnoticias.net/print.asp?idnews=96032
Fig. 4.2.4: Satellite Imagery of Urban Lima and Surrounding Highlands (1990)
Fig. 4.2.5 Satellite Imagery of Rural CuZco and Surrounding Highlands (1990)
Human Terrain: Rural to Urban Migration
Figs. 4.2.1-5 present the treacherous physical terrain defining SL's operational environment. But
what about the human terrain? For this, we may turn to period urbanization studies. In 1971, the
Ford Foundation commissioned a study examining urbanization in Peru. 159 The authors peg
urbanization in Peru at "no more than 35%" in 1970.160 Rural-centric mobilization therefore
expectedly coincided with a large agrarian population, in 1980 (Phase I) 38% of the total
population -and there is reason to believe this figure is much lower than actual. 1
The above cited Ford Foundation project also identifies a second interesting phenomenon
of "macrocephaly," defined in urban studies as the disproportionate preponderance of a single
mass city.162 Lima is reportedly home to 20% of Peru's 1971 population -an urban population
primacy of "15 to 1"- which the authors accurately project to only grow with increasing
159 Robin, John P. and Frederick C. Terzo. "Urbanization in Peru." Ford Foundation. 1971.
160 In the same year, early SL pamphlets would consistently emphasize the agrarian nature of the Peruvian economy, and
the strategic salience of proceeding from rural bases to urban centers. Bandera Roja. 1971, p. 6. Sendero Luminoso
collection of pamphlets, serials, fliers, and party congresses from 1962 to 1985 (reel 1). On the urbanization rate in Peru,
Robin, John P. and Frederick C. Terzo. "Urbanization in Peru." Ford Foundation. 1971, p. i.
161 This figure is drawn from the UN. However, there is reason to accept the Ford Foundation study as indicative of the
actual level of urbanization in Peru due to its more precise differentiation between "rural" and "urban" communities.
The study notes that "Peru, like any other country cannot be understood by studying statistics -no matter how detailed.
This becomes immediately clear when the statistics which define 'urban' and 'rural' places Peru are examined, not on
their face or census value, but on the validity of the classification which may be variously employed. The census statistics
gave Peru an 'urban' population of 47.2 per cent in 1961, but they classified as urban any settlement which served as the
administrative headquarters of a district, plus any other settlement which was the equivalent of such a 'district'
headquarters. Another method of calculation, used places of more than 2,000 population for statistical purposes; on this
basis, the percentage of urban population fell to 39.4%. In our judgment, all of these classifications exaggerate the urban
quality of Peru. The country has only one major urban center, which is metropolitan Lima. Its true percentage of
genuine urban population, generously interpreted, is now almost certainly no more than 35 per cent, instead of the more
than 50 per cent which would be the estimate for 1971 if the official definitions were not critically examined." Thus, the
Ford Foundation projects Peru's rural population, in 1980, to be at 62%, rather than the UN estimate of 38%. Ibid. For
UN estimates, see "World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision Population Database." United Nations. 2007.
http://esa.un.org/unup/p2kdata.asp.
162 Ibid. ii - iii.
urbanization.163 The identified trend of macrocephaly holds, with Lima's 8.769 million residents
today ~30% of Peru's 71.6% urbanized 29.248 million population.164
Against a backdrop of millenarian insurgency, Peru's population therefore shifted over
thirty years to Lima, and a handful of provincial urban centers [Arequipa (841,120); Callao (813,
264); Trujillo (747,450); and Chiclayo (577, 375)].165 This trend of urbanization, moving to
66.9% by 1985 (ca. Phase 11-III), and 68.9% by 1990 (ca. Phase III urban attacks), also coincided
with a shift in SL base of operations from the rural periphery, to urban Lima. Table 4.2.1 gives
UN estimates on the percentage of urban population in Peru during the approximate period
covered by the ACD dataset. 166 The Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project (GRUMP) (2009) and
Gridded Population of the World (GPW) (2005) map Peru's macrocephalic, largely urbanized
population (fig. 4.2.6), today largely removed from rough mountain settlements (fig. 4.2.7-8).
Tab. 4.2.1: Percentage of Urban Population in Peru (1970 - 1990)
Year Percentage Urban
1970 57.4
1975 61.5
1980 64.6
1985 66.9
1990 68.9
163 Ibid.
164 Peru. CIA World Fact Book. 2011. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pe.html
165 Ibid.
166 As noted, these figures, drawn from UN World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision Population Database,
should be interpreted with caution. If accounting only for settlements with more than a 2,000 person population, rather
than any perceived position as an administrative headquarters, the actual percentage of urbanization in Peru would be far
lower. Nevertheless, these statistics are presented as they are the most available and widely cited. For UN estimates, see
"World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision Population Database." United Nations. 2007.
http://esa.un.org/unup/p2kdata.asp
Fig. 4.2.6: GRUMP: Macrocephalic Lima
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Fig. 4.2.7: GPW: Population Density in Peru, Coinciding Largely with Terrain
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Fig. 4.2.8: ArcGIS: Mapping Population Density in Peru by Province
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Institutional Terrain: The Vulnerability of Transition
Peru's physical terrain of rough mountains, and human terrain of rural-to-urban migration, are
thus defined. To briefly discuss period institutional topography, Peru underwent a relatively
painful bureaucratic transition from military dictatorship to civilian rule beginning in 1980,
coinciding with Phase I SL operations. First, a serious of particularly egregious corruption
scandals immediately gutted the ranks of top state enforcers.167 Second, the ousted military
pilfered and absconded state intelligence and analytics on SL, thereby depriving the newly
minted civilian government of a decade of information on SL organization and operations.168
The purpose of the military's perfidy was as cunning as it was disastrously bloody: To
"award the new democracy a Trojan horse, carrying an insurgency it neither understood nor
clearly detected," thereby ensuring a return to military rule. 169 Simply, the civilian government
was unprepared to fight. Accordingly, an NIS report dated September 15, 1984, coinciding with
Phase III offensive operations, considers a truce with SL, to later include amnesty for its
171thousands of fighters, and a withdrawal of state forces from the declared emergency zones.
We have thus identified four important variables defining SL's operational environment
immediately prior to insurgency onset. They are (1) mountain highland and jungle bases in
Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and the Upper Huallaga Cayamarca provinces; (2) a largely rural-
centric population; (3) an overarching trend of increasing urbanization; and (4) a relatively weak,
transitional state government. Last, an organizational emphasis on the hierarchical
implementation of Maoist guerrilla doctrine is apparent. Now, given the foregoing discussion on
167 The Shining Path: A Histoy of the Millenarian War in Peru. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Chapel
Hill Press. 1999, p. 40.
168 Ibid., pp. 43 - 54.
169 Ibid. p. 42.
170 Implicancia de las iniciativaspara una tregua con Sendero Luminoso. Servicio de Inteigencia Nacional. September 15, 1984. 2nd
collection of ephemera from the Peruvian insurrection (1st reel).
guerrilla doctrine describing the material relationship between insurgent operational
environment, and dependent modes of organization, logistical capacity, and feasible tactics, what
does this mean for how we may expect SL to organize and fight? What may we predict vis-a-vis
Phase 1-111 SL war production, between 1980-1992, considering the above described
socioeconomic and organizational conditions?
IV.3. Dependent Variables: Structure, Capacity, Tactics, Classification
In the first noted operational environment, pinpointed in ACD, SL fielded a highly centralized
insurgent army, with manpower allocations almost identical to Mao's rural force
recommendations (Appendix I).!" During Phase II - III operations (1982-1992), the SL rural
Ejercito Popular de Liberacion (ELP) of the Ayacucho Zonal Committee was organized into the
following military units: three-battalion regional armies; three-company battalions; three platoon
companies; and nine-eleven-man platoons. 172 Again, Guzmin himself headed every major
committee, including the Central, Political, Permanent, Presidential, and Military
Commissions.173 Most equipment was stolen from overrun police stations, with explosives, e.g.
dynamite, obtained from ransacked mining operations. 7 4 As such SL units were (1) highly
hierarchical, and (2) well equipped.
SL rural units were additionally divided into three organizational tiers: (-1) "local
guerrillas," the (-2) "regional force," and the (-3) "principal force." The (-1) local guerrillas were
expendable villagers who worked the fields by day, and conducted SL raids by night. The (-2)
171 Reproduced in Appendix I.
7 2 Although ACD codes the insurgency to have started in 1981, SL did not enter Phase II and III fighting until later in
the conflict. Ibid., pp. 104-105.
173 Ibid., pp. 82-83.
74 Gorriti, Gustavo and Robin Kirk (trans.). The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru. Chapel Hill and
London: University of North Carolina Chapel Hill Press. 1999, pp. 107-118.
"regional force" consisted of better armed and trained local guerrillas, covering several
provinces. Finally, the (-3) "principal force" consisted of the best trained and equipped men, kept
in reserve. 175 A centralized military structure had an important effect on SL logistical capacity;
ELP moved to capture and hold much of Ayacucho Province.
By 1982-3, then President Alan Garcia declared Ayacucho an emergency zone, and
ordered an intensive counter-insurgency campaign to clear entrenched ELP forces.176
Accordingly, NIS intelligence report no. 001-DGIFI documents a quantitative and qualitative
escalation in emergency zone attacks as Phase II SL forces gained in organizational and logistical
sophistication between 1983 - 1984. Operations moved from "sabotage, assaults, death threats,
and urban-cell agitation" in 1983, to the "assault of state military forces, and the capture of
territory and highland towns by 1984 [emphasis added]." 77 Military intelligence report no. 35
B-2, delivered on April 15, 1986, documents reported SL subversive activity and enabling
capacity by operational environment during SL Phase 11-111 campaigns, particularly from the
Huinuco and Pasco, Huancavelica, and Huancayo departments. The following summary tables
are derived from this report, which although less than representative, is nevertheless striking. 7
Location and Terrain Forces and Mission Capacity
Location: Huinuco y Pasco Forces: ~80 men and 15 women Capacity: "Well equipped," with
arms and medicine. Access to
Terrain: Encamped over four Mission: "Maintaining and vehicles, and an extensive
hills. Called "inaccessible," with increasing" control and power workforce of laborers and
no roads save for a dirt path. of the department. university-educated engineers.
175 Ibid., p. 69.
176 Weinstein, Jeremy M. Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007, pp.
85-87.
177Nota de Informacion No. 001-DGIFI. Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional. July 18, 1984, p. 1-7. 2nd collection of ephemera from
the Peruvian insurrection (1st reel).
178 Nota de Informacion No. 35-B-2. Servicio de Intelencia Nacional. July 18, 1984, 2nd collection of ephemera from the
Peruvian insurrection (1st reel).
Location and Terrain Forces and Mission Capacity
Location: Huancavelica Forces: ~120 men and women Capacity: "Simultaneously attack
[area] mines... attacks may be
Terrain: Encamped in the Mission: "Procuring large launched at any hour, with the
"highlands of a small town quantities of explosives, and authority to eliminate any
called Laramarca." organizing "militias in all cities impeding police forces."
and peasant communities."
Location and Terrain Forces and Mission Capacity
Location: Huancayo Forces: ~25 members of the Capacity: "Equipped with
"Red Army," directed by machine guns, bombs, and
Terrain: Huicracocha Lagoon Abimael Guzman himself dynamite charges."
Mission: "Department meeting"
on new strategy and tactics.
Northern SL forces were even more sophisticated and capable than the above cited
emergency zone forces. CRH units, centered in the Upper Huallaga, managed to outlast even the
decapitation of SL following the arrest of Guzmin in 1992. Between 60-120 soldiers, CRH units
were larger than ELP Ayacucho highland forces and were "heavily militarized."17 9 CRH units
were equipped with heavy weaponry, and a full range of equipment, including uniforms.180
Unlike the more lightly equipped highland ELP forces, CRH guerrillas most approximated a
Phase III conventional force. Tellingly, CRH operated in the densest terrain: the Amazon.'
179 Ibid., p. 156.
180 Ibid.
181 Ibid., p. 89.
In terms of tactics and dependent target set, an interesting dynamic is apparent. Although
acknowledged to be highly organized,s 2 ELP military technique was initially "extremely
poor." 8 3 Organization -no matter how complete- cannot compensate for lack of operational
experience. Initial (-1) and (-2) insurgent attacks were amateurish, mob-like raids, directed
against wealthy ranchers and under-manned police stations.' 84 Guzmin noted the essential
paradox of launching a guerrilla war with an uneducated peasantry; however, the solution was
not to offer better training, but rather escalate attacks -the cauldron of battle was considered the
best training ground.185
Tactical sophistication would advance to military-centric raids and ambushes and heavy
industrial sabotage after Guzmin's 1982 directive "Desplegar Guerra de Guerrillas, " or the
commencement of Phase II guerrilla war.1 86 However, SL terrorism, 18 7 both a Phase I vestigial
tactic and doctrinal perversion (Guzmin had strayed from Mao's prescriptions regarding proper
182 SL was said to be "much larger and more disciplined organization that almost anyone realized then -or afterward:
distributed over territory with a rudimentary, yet functional communications system, and a centralized leadership, which
guaranteed unified control over the party apparatus at all times." Gorriti, Gustavo and Robin Kirk (trans.). The Shining
Path: A Histoy of the Millenarian War in Peru. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Chapel Hill Press.
1999, pp. 85-87.
183 Ibid.
184 SL activity in Ayacucho had intensified throughout 1980. By early 1981, numerous attacks were conducted across the
province. Small police outposts were especially hard-hit. On January 13, 1980, fifteen SL fighters attacked the police
station in the town of San Jos6 de Secce. The completely unprepared police force at station simply fled. The attackers
made off with two machine guns, two revolvers, an M-1 automatic rifle, and several crates of ammunition. A string of
apparently ill-defended stations were subsequently attacked. However militants were often beaten back, and many later
captured. Several of the militants arrested for the San Jos6 de Secce attack, for example, had participated in every prior
SL attack in Ayacucho. This suggests not only an initially low operational capacity, but cadre. Ibid., p. 79-81.
185 Ibid., pp. 86-87.
186 At its apex, few state forces remained outside SL targeting capacity. Even today, decades after the virtual decapitation
of SL, military helicopters, are, for example, regularly -and successfully- attacked. "El objetivo era derribar el
Helic6ptero." La Republica. March, 2011. http://www.larepublica.pe/17-03-2011/el-objetivo-era-derribar-el-
helicoptero-0.
187 SL was responsible for several massacres of rural peasantry considered uncooperative or collaborationist, and
terrorism remained an essential SL tactic throughout its organizational evolution -despite its dubious strategic value. In
1989, for example, a reported ~250 SL guerrillas attacked a small village outside Ayacucho, allegedly for having formed a
self-defense militia, at the behest of the army, to protect from SL attacks. The attacking rebels identified the villages 23
men and dragged them to the village courtyard. The militants then killed each of them by crushing their heads with a
rock and slitting their throats. The battered corpses were then further mutilated in front of the victims' families. This is
only one of many village massacres reportedly perpetrated by SL. Hayes, Monte. "Survivors Describe Massacre by
Shining Path." The Washington Times. April 26, 2002.
population conduct), continued. 188 Therefore hierarchical SL rural units, although tending toward
military-centric attacks, are nonetheless best classified as guerrilla-terrorists. The applicability of
model 3.1.1 is immediately apparent, with rural hierarchies operating alongside limited city
networks, "the necessary complement," in a multi-front mode of insurgency.
In 1988, Guzmin made the decision to shift toward urban operations. Phase I - III
guerrilla operations were on the verge of affecting state collapse; 189 urban operations were
considered the last step in a rural-centric strategy designed to slowly surround and strangle
isolated cities.190 With regard to urban force structure, period intelligence cites a three to five
member cell structure (tab. 4.3.1). 1 Cells were concentrated according to municipal division,
with the Lima metropolitan area divided into six areas of operation.192
Tab. 4.3. 1: Intelligence Citing SL Urban Force Structure
SECRETARIO
SUB-SECRETARIO
ENCARGADO DE INFORMACIONES
188 In addition to bloody civilian-centric reprisals, SL conducted an intensive sabotage campaign targeting urban centers.
Some 1,200 high-voltage towers were destroyed by SL between 1982-1999. For SI industrial sabotage, see Marticorena,
Manuel. "Historfas detras de los apagones." El Comercio. March, 2011.
189 Military desertion rates were high. Poor growth and high inflation sapped government capacity. Weinstein, Jeremy M.
Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007, pp. 88-89.
190 Gorriti, Gustavo and Robin Kirk (trans.). The Shining Path:A Histoy ofthe Millenarian War in Pern. Chapel Hill and
London: University of North Carolina Chapel Hill Press. 1999, pp. 75-88.
191 A similar proposed urban-cell force structure (Enders and Su 2007), with the added advantage of mapping cell density
as a function of security, is provided in Appendix I, table 2. On captured SL documents indicating advised urban cell
force structure, see Inca, Ger6nimo. EABC de Sendero Luninosoy delMRTA. Lima: Grupo Editorial Ger6nimo Inca SA
(GEGISA). 1994, pp. 97 - 108.
192 Ibid., p. 96.
With regard to tactics and classification, as according to a directive issued by the SL
metropolitan committee, the above noted cellular force structure was divided into two
operational tiers, each with distinct responsibilities. The expendable (-1) and (-2) second-tier cell
network, part of an "action committee," was charged with vandalism, propaganda, arson, and
low-level level explosives attacks. "Higher-level" actions, consisting of "sabotage, public
disturbance, and political killings, were to be carried out by the (-3) "Destacamento Especial,"1 93
or Special Detachment.'
Expectedly given the above noted cell-based force structure, limited to three to five
member teams, feasible operations were limited to soft targets, with a proclivity for spectacle.
NIS intelligence delivered on July 18, 1984, reports SL urban cells to be mostly tasked with
"terrorizing voters, arson, hostage-taking, exploding roads and state posts, sabotage, and
acquiring arms." 195 By 1992, a wave of Marighella-model urban terror culminated with a truck
bomb explosion in the middle-class Lima suburb of Miraflores, killing 22, injuring 250, and
destroying 400 homes.1 96 The tactic of choice for SL urban cells is hence terrorism, with a
military classification of guerrilla-terrorist. As with rural SL forces, the model suggested in this
study may benefit from a consideration of a multi-tier urban force structure. Last, it does not
seem SL ever eroded state urban power sufficiently to reach more logistically sophisticated (-2)
or (-3) urban guerrilla hierarchies specified in model 3.3.1.
193 Gorriti, Gustavo and Robin Kirk (trans.). The Shining Path: A Histoy of the Millenarian War in Peru. Chapel Hill and
London: University of North Carolina Chapel Hill Press. 1999, pp. 83-84.
194 Inca, Ger6nimo. E/ABC de Sendero Luminosoj delMRTA. Lima: Grupo Editorial Ger6nimo Inca SA (GEGISA).
1994, p. 107.
195 Nota de Informacion No. 35-B-2. Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional. July 18, 1984, 2nd collection of ephemera from the
Peruvian insurrection (1t reel).
196 Weinstein, Jeremy M. Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007, p.
87.
Discussion
In conclusion, we may tentatively propose the following. SL initial mobilization, according to
NIS intelligence and captured directives, occurred over the rough Ayacucho highlands.
Following a review of ArcGIS satellite topography and supplementary population data, and it is
clear that Phase I SL units made (1) use of rough mountainous terrain, and (2) hosting rural
communities, then a (3) large percentage of the population, located far from the (4) disorganized
and transitional incumbents in coastal Lima.
Furthermore, rural-centric, Maoist guerrilla doctrine played an essential role throughout
SL modes of organization and attack. The impact of doctrine is apparent from Guzmin's decision
to move to Ayacucho, to a later emphasis of rural mobilization at the expense of city work -even
as urbanization accelerated over Phase I-III operations. Interestingly, by 1988, the operational
emphasis of rural-centric Maoist doctrine had shifted, with urban Lima the focus of SL
operations rather than the previously stated "complement" of country drives.
This seems expected, as by this year, urbanization in Peru would be approaching ~70%.
Despite this apparent modification of doctrine advising optimal guerrilla operational
environment, SL force structures are essentially identical to those suggested throughout fighting
manuals reviewed and modeled in this thesis. An organizational hybrid between rural hierarchies
and urban networks is thus apparent; however, a major shift in population, from, in the case of
Peru, the rural periphery, to a preponderant urban center, may result in a strategic and
organizational return to single-mode insurgency.
IV.4. Relevance of Guerrilla Doctrine and Derived Models
The above presented case study of Peru's vaunted Sendero Luminoso in part confirms the
external validity of model 3.1.1, which, prior to the noted shift in Peru's population to
macrocephalic Lima during the 1980's, seems to better apply to a once rural-centric Peru than
model 3.3.1.197 To this end, it seems terrain may adequately proxy for government control in
rural-centric asymmetric conflict, should prevailing conditions of urbanization hold constant.
As illustrated by model 3.1.1, guerrilla operational environment, as defined by the
physical, human, and institutional terrain, largely determined SL organizational structure and
dependent operational sophistication. Highland and jungle guerrilla forces, launching demanding
military attacks, were more numerous and better equipped than small, hermetic Lima terror cells.
Interestingly, guerrilla doctrine -in addition to accurately reflecting the material conditions of
battle vis-a'-vis optimal network structure as a function of operational environment- factored
perhaps more upon initial organization, than even more pragmatic, material considerations.
Second, in addition to the modeled relationship between operational environment and
organizational structure, SL guerrilla forces were able to graduate from Maoist, rural-centric
guerrilla war, to al-Muqrin's conception of multi-front insurgency. As illustrated by model 3.1.1,
SL forces initially organized and spread from the low-control rural periphery (e.g. the Ayacucho
Highlands and dense Upper Huallaga jungles), to the high-control urban center (e.g. Lima's
197 With 77% of Peruvians living in cities, Peru is today an urban-majority state. This may in part explain the relative
irrelevance of vestigial SL units still fighting in Peru's deserted rural periphery. In 1971, however, coinciding with initial
CPP proselytizing and agitation, as coded by ACD (1965 - 1999), only ~35% of Peru's population lived in cities -or the
same as Yemen today. SL only graduated to a multi-front insurgency with the initiation of city operations in 1988, long
after a majority of Peru's population had moved to urban centers. On Peru's demographics in 2011, 1971, and 1986, see
"Urbanization." The Central Intelligence Agency World Fact Book. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/fields/2212.html; Tam, Luis. "Rural-to-Urban Migration in Bolivia and Peru: Association with Child
Mortality, Breastfeeding Cessation, Maternal Care, and Contraception." Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS)
Working Papers. DHS. 1994, p. 1; and Robin, John P. and Frederick C. Terzo. "Urbanization in Peru: An International
Urbanization Survey Report to the Ford Foundation." The Ford Foundation. 1972, pp. i - iv.
Miraflores district), as state control correspondingly receded.'9 A military-centric rural drive
thus subsequently proceed alongside civilian-centric urban operations in multi-front insurgency,
with mountain, jungle, and city units structured accordingly. This structural hybrid between rural
hierarchies and urban networks presents a fluid spectrum of guerrilla organization, unconfined to
the rural/urban dichotomy postulated in civil war scholarship and COIN analytics. And this may
have remained the dominant mode of SL war production had Peru not experienced such drastic
urbanization over Phase I-III operations, shifting SL's hosting rural communities to the city.
Several hypotheses derived from model 3.1.1 may thus be tentatively confirmed. First,
influential guerrilla doctrine advising (1) optimal network structure as a function of environment,
and (2) staged multi-front guerrilla war, accurately reflects the material conditions of prevailing
rural-centric insurgency. Presented guerrilla doctrine is hence of strategic and operational value
to the scholar and practitioner of COIN looking to understand how guerrillas organize as a
function of operational environment. Second, model 3.1.1 accurately reflects the course
insurgency may expectedly take in less urbanized states economically and demographically
similar to those of rural-centric theoreticians. Third, model 3.1.1 will accurately reflect guerrilla
organization in states in which terrain may still reasonably proxy for government control. The
developed Global North seems to apply, where cities are relatively well policed and serviced, as
well as still rural-centric states in the Global South. However, as in the case of Peru during the
latter half of the 1980's, however, the global trends of increasing urbanization, dissolution of
state power, and decline in politically motivated violence may contribute to an increase in
typically rare urban guerrilla war.
198 If any guerrilla insurgency in Latin America after Castro's has come closer to capturing state power, it was SL. Prior
to intelligence leading to the capture of Guzman, the Peruvian government seemed on the verge of collapse. Weinstein,
Jeremy M. Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007, pp. 88-89.
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Thus far only the relevance of model 3.1.1 has been discussed. This is because model
3.3.1 is, as explained, more readily applied to and evaluated against the modem phenomenon of
highly urbanized, weak states, where terrain may not reasonably proxy for government control
and expected guerrilla organization and tactics. This would seem to be the case with Peru during
the mid to late 1980's; however, Abimael Guzmin was captured before SL urban units could
evolve sufficiently to confirm or challenge hypotheses derived from model 3.3.1.
A comprehensive evaluation of model 3.3.1 against a second case-study insurgency,
occurring within a wider context of appropriate socioeconomic variables, is better conducted in a
separate assessment. Model 3.3.1 may still reasonably apply to individual theatres of SL
operation, i.e. the rural - urban binary, rather than the observed multi-front insurgency
employing rural and urban units. However, this thesis -as limited to a case-study confirming the
strategic and operational value of largely rural-centric guerrilla doctrine only- may thus,
accordingly, only speculate as to the effects of cited global trends on non-state actor war
production. For the purposes of this study, it is enough that they are recognized and considered
when evaluating guerrilla doctrine.
V. Conclusion: Summary and Implications
V.1. Summary
This study aims to assess the operational value of guerrilla doctrine, and to clarify essential
characteristics of non-state actor modes of organization and dependent war production debated in
COIN analytics and civil war scholarship. To this end, the independent variable of operational
environment is identified. Following a review of influential guerrilla doctrine, the modeled
independent variable of operational environment, defined by the physical, human, and
institutional terrain of a given asymmetric conflict, appears to have the greatest effect on the
dependent variable of organizational structure.
Organizational structure, in turn, affects feasible tactics and target set -it is inadvisable
for clandestine cells to acquire notable physical assets, and employ them against well equipped
state forces. Attrition to infiltration, and battle, would simply impose prohibitive costs. Yet in the
bush, far from watching eyes, the guerrilla may grow in strength and number unobserved -or
worse, ignored. When afforded sanctuary, small units may reach a level of organization and
dependent logistical capacity comparable to conventional armies.
This thesis has attempted to capture this dynamic, described throughout evaluated
guerrilla doctrine. Consistently, guerrilla theoreticians, fighting across multiple guerrilla fronts,
find groups afforded sanctuary are most likely to develop numerous, centralized, forces, best
equipped to capture state control from incumbent militaries. Hermetic urban cells, quantitatively
demonstrable of valuing security over communicational efficiency and logistical capacity, are
accordingly expected to interact less with a population often the only feasible target for
impactful, mass-casualty attacks. This operational dynamic, discussed by guerrilla theoreticians,
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and modeled in this thesis, is partly confirmed in the preceding case-study review. As such,
influential guerrilla doctrine presented in this thesis is assessed as accurately reflective of
prevailing rural-centric asymmetric conflict, granting a valuable perspective on items of interest
to the counter-insurgent and civil war scholar. Indeed, doctrine may count more than material
considerations vis-a'-vis preferred organization and modes of operation at insurgency onset.
However, any evaluation of practitioner literature failing to consider the socioeconomic
conditions of its writing may be theoretically incomplete and prove operationally inadequate.
This is true when assessing influential guerrilla doctrine. Much reflects a mostly rural-centric
past (Mao 1938; Guevara 1969). Even reviewed urban-centric theoreticians were obliged to
recognize the essential role of the food-producing countryside (Guillen 1966).199 Indeed, the
contest over rough terrain has featured prominently in most incidents of asymmetric conflict.
Examples of sustained urban insurgency have been rare -major cites tend to be centers of state
power, whereas the inaccessible rural periphery, where it exists, tends not to be.
But today, in a world of a deserted rural periphery, and sprawling, marginalized urban
slums -a human terrain as treacherous and inaccessible as any mountain or jungle stronghold-
may we soon witness a new era of predominantly urban insurgency and civil war? May the
conventional wisdom positing rural centers as the only feasible base for sustained insurgency be
outdated, reflecting a world of a once rural majority now passed? By removing the independent
variable from an entirely physical conception of operational environment, i.e. terrain, model
3.3.1 attempts to capture the global trends of increasing urbanization and dissolution of state
power. And model 3.3.1 does so while reflecting still relevant model 3.1.1 lessons on optimal
urban network structure and multi-front insurgency. A case-study review of one of the most
199 Guiln, Abraham. Philosophy of the Urban Guerilla: The Revolutionay Writings ofAbraham Guillin. New York: William
Morrow & Company, Inc. 1973, p. 239.
successful guerrilla organizations in the 2 0 th century appears to confirm the basic findings and
derived hypotheses of model 3.1.1. SL units were structured according to theatre, and removed
from the artificial rural-urban operational binary proposed in COIN and civil war scholarship.
However, additional case-study research, focusing on examples of violent conflict and
insurgency in modern, urbanized states, with still operational guerrilla units, is required to assess
the external validity of model 3.3.1.
As such, the conclusions of this study are limited. Influential guerrilla doctrine, speaking
to an understudied dynamic relating insurgent front and organization, is relevant to our
understanding of asymmetric conflict today. However, it is only in states in which terrain may
still reasonably proxyfor government control. Outside this condition, and the COIN scholar and
practitioner would do well to consider additional socioeconomic variables.
V.2. Implications
In terms of policy implications, this study provides five. First, sanctuary is considered
paramount. Groups need sanctuary to effectively organize and affect logistically complex -and in
the case of pre-9/1 1 al-Qa'ida- transnational strikes. Should the US choose to leave COIN
battlefields in the Near East and Central Asia, our political leadership would do well to maintain
a contingency of Special Operations Forces, augmented by weaponized drone wings, in theatre
to deny hostile organizations sanctuary. Otherwise, we may be again faced with mass-casualty
attacks against US interests in the region, or at home. And, by defining operational environment
to for example more broadly include the human and institutional topography of a given
asymmetric conflict -as much as physical terrain- the contribution of identifying any alternative
sphere of social mobilization as potentially hosting and coordinating of more sophisticated
modes of non-state actor organization, is provided. This includes the virtual spheres of social
interaction, coordination, and organization, and indeed any platforms exploiting state regulation
and power voids.
Second, this paper emphasizes the importance of properly identifying the military
classification of a given non-state actor. Politically and militarily, it may be productive, for
example, to note the organizational structure, logistical capacity, and preferred target set of a
party before classifying it as a terrorist group. Hezbollah and HAMAS are salient examples. Both
are quasi-state organizations that have conducted terrorist attacks -HAMAS has killed scores of
Israeli civilians, and Hezbollah is responsible for more American deaths than any violent non-
state actor with the exception of al-Qa'ida. 200
Yet are HAMAS and Hezbollah, groups that provide important local services, represent a
sizeable constituency, and maintain active political wings, equivalent to post-9/11 al-Qa'ida?
The answer is no. And this response is not born of moral relativism. It is because target set
dictates strategy and tactics. HAMAS and Hezbollah, for example, seem to be at the
organizational extreme of model 3.1.1. That is, guerrillas offered sanctuary so secure and for so
long that they have organized into quasi-state agencies, with a dependent logistical capacity so
developed, each today usurp state responsibilities of popular governance, and in the case of
Hezbollah, inter-state war. As such both HAMAS and Hezbollah seem closer to insurgencies,
best combated with population-centric COIN strategy and tactics, than parasitic CCN with little
popular support, best neutralized with kinetic CT.
Third, strategy, tactics, and public rhetoric must therefore be disaggregated and refined
according to front and campaign. Drone strikes in the Afghan COIN theatre, are, for example, a
200 "Urging the European Union to Add Hezbollah to the European Union's Wide Ranging List of Terrorist
Organizations." Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Non-Proliferation. US Congress. 2005, p. 8.
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intirel/hfa99596.000/hfa99596_0f.htm.
CT tactic, and as such should be subordinated to a comprehensive COIN strategy -indeed
dispensed with if proven to cause more harm than good. And if we are to take evaluated guerrilla
doctrine presented in this thesis at face value, the term "war on terrorism" is similarly misguided.
It suggests a military solution to what is a problem best handled by police and intelligence
agencies. As guerrilla organizational structure and dependent logistical capacity are largely a
function of operational environment, civilian-centric urban cells are best monitored, infiltrated,
and destroyed by local security services, and not invading militaries.
Fourth, if terrorism is, as guerrilla doctrine and derived models presented in this thesis
suggest, best defined by a range of organizational determinants, rather than an employed tactic of
terrorism, then the oft-cited menace of terrorist organizations acquiring and deploying weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) is overstated. Logistically limited urban cells are unlikely to boast
the expertise and resources required to design, assemble, test, and deliver workable nuclear,
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chemical, biological, or radiological (NCBR) WMD. Conversely, the value of NCBR WMD to
rural units seems limited unless miniaturized and deployed tactically. This is outside the
technical capability of most states, let alone guerrilla organizations.
The real WMD threat thus lies not with exotic, resource-intensive NCBR technology, but
with small arms and conventional explosives proliferation, and unconventional tactics. The
ubiquitous Kalashnikov and its derivatives, military and commercial-grade high explosives, and
unconventional tactics employing available technology [e.g. Explosively Formed Penetrator
(EFP) IED], have killed more civilians and soldiers in the post-World War II era of small wars
201 Even the highly centralized and capable Japanese terrorist-cult Aum Shinrikyo, with a billion dollars in assets, dozens
of high-caliber Russian and Japanese scientists, and an assortment of small and heavy arms, could not reliably develop
and deploy WMD. Croddy, A. Eric, James J. Wirtz, and Jeffrey A. Larsen. Weapons ofMass Destruction: An Engclopedia of
Worldwide Poligy, Technology, and Histog. Santa Barbara. 2005, pp. 29 - 32.
and asymmetric conflict than devoted WMD systems.202 Civilian-centric terrorism, conducted by
either guerrilla or terrorist organizations, is thus more likely to be modeled after the largely
conventional 2004 Madrid, 2005 London, and 2008 Mumbai attacks, and not terrorist WMD
strikes.203 Policy makers would hence be well advised to focus on other, less visible weapons
proliferation threats.
Fifth, if state capacity is to be considered the fundamental determinant of guerrilla
organization and corresponding operational sophistication, then the next wave of non-state actor
violence may expectedly occur in weak, urban states. As much of the Global South is plagued by
endemic overpopulation, and unsustainable urbanization straining government capacity, the
developing world seems as much at risk of once rare urban guerrilla war -politically motivated
or otherwise- as typical patterns of rural-centric insurgency. Marighella's strategy of
decentralized, civilian-centric urban war, and al-Muqrin's conception of multi-front insurgency,
thus seem more probable than ever should the current trends of increasing urbanization and state
202 The "AK" in AK-47 stands for Avtomat Kalashnikova, or Kalashnikov's automatic. But in parts of Europe, "AK"
stands for something else: Africa Killer. The definitive account of the mass production and proliferation of the infamous
Kalashnikov killing machine, largely unnoticed by cold warriors and proliferation specialists focusing on the more visible
WMD, is provided by New York Times correspondent CJ Chivers. For the quote on what "AK" may informally stand
for, see Chivers, CJ. The Gun. New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: Simon and Shuster. 2010, p. 372. For a discussion
on the continental devastation caused by small arms proliferation, see Che, Kevin Ngang. "Small Arms and Light
Weapons, Africa's True WMDs: The Role of SALW in Conflict and Insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa." Master's Thesis,
European University Center for Peace Studies (EPU). 2007. The US military forces did not find NCBR weapons in Iraq.
What they found was enough Kalashnikovs and high explosives salvaged from conventional stockpiles to sustain an
insurgency and terrorism campaign that killed thousands of Coalition soldiers and Iraqi civilians. When US armor
proved the ineffectiveness of obsolete Soviet-design anti-tank weapons, guerrillas accordingly adapted weapons and
tactics. For tactical innovation in the Iraqi theatre, see Burton, Fred. "The Imminent Spread of EFPs ." Stratford.
http://www.stratfor.com/imminent-spread-efps.
203 In each cited attack, urban cells killed with home-made explosives and small arms. The 2004 Madrid attacks were
conducted with Spanish-made military explosives and pilfered dynamite. The explosives used by the UK cell in the 2005
London subway bombings were crude devices "built on a shoe-string budget," with one accidentally forgotten on a tour
bus. The 2008 Mumbai rampage was committed by men armed with conventional explosives and Kalashnikovs. On
explosives used by the Madrid bombers, see Osborne, Sean. Terror Group Salafia Islamia / Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group
(GICM) Unquestionably Linked to AlQaeda. , North East Intelligence Network, 2005. On the London attacks, see Cowell,
Alan. "Reports Fault Intelligence for London Blasts." The New York Times, 11 May 2006. For a report commissioned by
the office of New Jersey Senator Frank Lautenberg on the looming threat of terrorist attacks committed by
conventionally armed military assault teams more similar to guerrilla units than CCN, also covering the slaughter in
Mumbai, see "Firearms, Explosives, and Terrorists: A Looming Threat, A Major US Vulnerability." 2010.
http://lautenberg.senate.gov/assets/TerrorReport.102010.pdf.
power dissolution continue. As such researchers, while acknowledging the value of influential
guerrilla doctrine, should perhaps shift their focus to urban, rather than rural-centric asymmetric
conflict.
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Appendix I: Advised Rural and Urban Guerrilla Force Structure
Appendix L 1: Organization of a Rural Maoist Guerrilla Regiment
Regimental Commander
Political Officer Chief of Staff
Regimental HQ and Three Battalions
1st Section
Operations
and
Training
2nd Section
Intelligence
3rd Section
Public Relations
4th Section
Administration
Medical/Transport
Sections
First Battalion Second Battalion Third Battalion
Source: Mao (1938)
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Appendix .2: Advised Urban Cell Structure: Density vs. Security
Cell 1: p=1
Cell 3b: p=2/3
Cell 3a: p=2/3
Cell 4b: p=1/ 2
Key
4M "Node," or cell membe
Communicatonal link
Source: Enders and Su (2007)
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Cell 2: p=5/6
Cell 4a: p=1/2
Appendix II: List of Civil Wars and Insurgencies
War years Case name
1 BELGIUM
2 FRANCE
3 FRANCE
4 FRANCE
5 FRANCE
6 FRANCE
7 FRANCE
8 GREECE
9 NETHERLANDS
10 PORTUGAL
11 PORTUGAL
12 PORTUGAL
13 UK
14 UK
15 UK
1956-61
1945-54
1947-48
1952-54
1953-56
1954-61
1955-60
1945-49
1945-46
1961-75
1962-74
1964-74
1950-56
1952-56
1969-99
Rwandan Revolution
Vietnam
Madagascar
Tunisia
Morocco
Algeria
Cameroon
DSE
IPA
Angola
Guinea-Bissau
Mozambique
CPM (Emergency)
Mau Mau
IRA
Eastern Europe
16 AZERBAIJAN
17 BOSNIA
18 CROATIA
19 GEORGIA
20 MOLDOVA
21 RUSSIA
22 RUSSIA
23 RUSSIA
24 RUSSIA
25 RUSSIA
26 RUSSIA
27 TAJIKISTAN
28 YUGOSLAVIA
1992-94
1992-95
1992-95
1992-94
1992-92
1946-48
1946-50
1946-47
1946-48
1994-96
1999-
1992-97
1991-91
Nagorno-Karabagh
Rep. Srpska/Croats
Krajina
Abkhazia
Dniestr Republic
Lithuania/BDPS
Ukraine/UPA
Latvia/LTSPA, etc.
Estonia/Forest Brthers
Chechnya
Chechnya II
Croatia/Krajina
Croatia/Krajina
Asia
AFGHANISTAN
AFGHNISTAN
BANGLADESH
BURMA
1978-92
1992-
1976-97
1948-
Mujahedeen
v. Taliban
Chittagong Hills/Shanti Bahini
CPB, Karens, etc.
Country
Western Europe
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33 CAMBODIA
34 CAMBODIA
35 CHINA
36 CHINA
37 CHINA
38 CHINA
39 INDIA
40 INDIA
41 INDIA
42 INDONESIA
43 INDONESIA
44 INDONESIA
45 INDONESIA
46 INDONESIA
47 INDONESIA
48 KOREA, S.
50 NEPAL
51 PAKISTAN
52 PAKISTAN
53 PAKISTAN
54 PAPUA N.G.
55 PHILIPPINES
56 PHILIPPINES
57 PHILIPPINES
58 SRI LANKA
59 SRI LANKA
60 SRI LANKA
61 VIETNAM, S.
North Africa/Middle East
62 ALGERIA
63 ALGERIA
64 CYPRUS
65 IRAN
66 IRAN
67 IRAQ
68 IRAQ
69 JORDAN
70 LEBANON
71 LEBANON
72 MOROCCO
73 TURKEY
74 TURKEY
75 YEMEN
76 YEMEN ARAB REP.
77 YEMEN ARAB REP.
78 YEMEN ARAB REP.
1970-75
1978-92
1946-50
1950-51
1956-59
1991-
1952-
1982-93
1989-
1950-50
1953-53
1958-60
1965-
1975-99
1991-
1949-50
1997-
1971-71
1973-77
1993-99
1988-98
1946-52
1968-
1972-94
1971-71
1983-
1987-89
1960-75
1962-62
1992-
1974-74
1978-79
1979-93
1959-59
1961-74
1970-70
1958-58
1975-90
1975-88
1977-80
1984-99
1994-94
1948-48
1962-69
1986-87
FUNK
Khmer Rouge, FUNCINPEC, etc.
PLA
Tibet
Tibet
Xinjiang
N. East Rebels
Sikhs
Kashmir
Rep. S. Moluccas
Darul Islam
Darul Islam, PRRI, Permesta
OPM (West Papua)
E. Timor
GAM (Aceh)
v. Rhee
CPN-M/UPF (Maoists)
Bangladesh
Baluchistan
MOM: Sindhis v. Mohajirs
BRA (Bougainville)
Huks
MNLF, MILF
NPA
JVP
LTTE, etc.
JVP II
NLF
Kabylie
FIS
Cypriots, Turkey
Khomeini
K(DPI (Kurds)
Shammar
KDP, PUK (Kurds)
Fedayeen/Syria v. govt.
Nasserites v. Chamoun
Various militias
Polisario
Militia-ized party politics
PKK
South Yemen
Opp. Coalition
Royalists
Faction of Socialist Party
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Sub-Saharan Africa
79 ANGOLA
80 ANGOLA
81 BURUNDI
82 BURUNDI
83 BURUNDI
84 CENT. AFRICAN REP.
85 CHAD
86 CHAD
87 CONGO
88 DEM. REP.
89 DEM. REP.
90 DEM. REP.
91 DEM. REP.
92 DJIBOUTI
93 ETHIOPIA
94 ETHIOPIA
CONGO
CONGO
CONGO
CONGO
95 GUINEA BISSAU
96 LIBERA
97 MALI
98 MOZAMBIQUE
99 NIGERA
100 RWANDA
101 RWANDA
102 SENEGAL
103 SIERRA LEONE
104 SOMALIA
105 SOMALIA
106 SOUTH AFRICA
107 SUDAN
108 SUDAN
109 UGANDA
110 UGANDA
111 ZIMBABWE
112 ZIMBABWE
1975-
1992-
1972-72
1988-88
1993-
1996-97
1965-
1994-98
1998-99
1960-65
1977-78
1996-97
1998-
1993-94
1974-92
1997-
1998-99
1989-96
1989-94
1976-95
1967-70
1962-65
1990-
1989-
1991-
1981-91
1991-
1983-94
1963-72
1983-
1981-87
1993-
1972-79
1983-87
UNITA
FLEC (Cabinda)
Hutu uprising
Org. massacres on both sides
Hutu groups v. govt.
Factional fighting
FROLINAT, various
Rebels in South
Fractional fighting
Katanga, Kasai, CNL
FLNC
AFDL (Kabila)
RCD, etc. v. govt.
FRUD
Eritrea, Tigray, etc.
ALF, ARDUF (AFARS)
Mil. faction
NPFL (Taylor), INPFL (Johnson)
Tuaregs
RENAMO
Biafra
Post-rev strife
RPF, genocide
MFDC (Casamance)
RUF, AFRC, etc.
SSDF, SNM (Isaaqs)
post-Barre war
ANC, PAC, Azapo
Anya Nya
SPLA, etc.
NRA, etc.
LRA, West Nile, etc.
ZANU, ZAPU
Ndebele guer's
Latin America and the Caribbean
ARGENTINA
ARGENTINA
BOLIVIA
COLOMBIA
COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA
CUBA
DOMINICAN REP.
1955-55
1973-77
1952-52
1948-62
1963-
1948-48
1958-59
1965-65
Mil. coup
ERP/Montoneros
MNR
La Violencia
FARC, ELN, etc.
NLA
Castro
Mil. coup
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
105
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
EL SALVADOR
GUATAMALA
HAITI
NICARAGUA
NICARAGUA
PARAGUAY
PERU
Appended Cases
A.1 ISRAEL
A.2 ISRAEL
1979-92
1968-96
1991-95
1978-79
1981-88
1947-47
1981-95
1946-1948
1948-
FMLN
URNG, various
Mil. coup
FSLN
Contras
Febreristas, Libs, Comms
Sendero Luminoso
Irgun
Various, occupied territories
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